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TAX BENEFIT RULE AND RELATED
DOCTRINES AS APPLIED TO THE
RECAPTURE OF RESEARCH AND OTHER
INTANGIBLE DEVELOPMENT COSTS
MATTHEW B. KRASNER*
PREFACE
As this article was being edited for publication, the Internal
Revenue Service ("Service") promulgated Revenue Ruling 85-1861
in which it reversed the long standing position set forth in Reve-
nue Ruling 72-528,1 that deductions claimed for research and de-
velopment costs pursuant to section 174(a)3 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code4 must be recaptured as ordinary income pursuant to
application of the tax benefit rule5 upon the subsequent sale of the
developed technology. That reversal validates the conclusion of
this article, but does not confirm its principle thesis that the tax
benefit rule operates to require the recognition of income but does
not characterize income recognized without benefit of the opera-
tion of the rule.
Precisely that issue was presented by the facts of the revoked
revenue ruling. There the proceeds of insurance from the destruc-
tion of a pilot model whose development costs had been deducted
pursuant to section 174(a) were taxed as ordinary income by ap-
plying the tax benefit rule. Ordinarily, such insurance proceeds
would have been accorded capital gain treatment.6 The effect of
applying the rule was not merely to recognize income that would
otherwise escape taxation but to convert capital gain to ordinary
income. That result was based on the ruling's erroneous assump-
* Assistant Professor, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America; A.B.,
University of Chicago, 1951; B.S. Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 1953; LLB.,
Harvard Law School, 1956; J.D. Georgetown Law Center, 1961.
1985-46 I.R.B.
2 Rev. Rul. 72-528, 1972-2 C.B. 481.
3 See infra note 25.
" Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 1, 66 (1954).
5 See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
' See infra note 26.
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tion that the insurance proceeds were in fact a recovery of the pre-
viously deducted research and development expenses. Those costs,
however, had been transmuted into the technology represented by
the pilot model. The insurance proceeds represented a recovery of
the value of the newly developed technology, not of the previously
deducted development expenses. The recovery of an expense nec-
essary to application of the tax benefit rule was absent. Moreover,
the Code has specific recapture provisions that apply to the dispo-
sition of property to recharacterize capital gain as ordinary in-
come.7 These provisions are inapplicable to the disposition of tech-
nology whose costs have been deducted pursuant to section 174(a)
and the ruling should not have applied the tax benefit rule to viti-
ate the mandate of these specific statutory rules.
Relying on the "fundamentally inconsistent event" test enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in Hillsboro National Bank v. Com-
missioner,8 the new ruling reverses the consequence of this error
by holding that the tax benefit rule is inapplicable for purposes of
recapturing research and development costs previously deducted
pursuant to section 174(a). According to the Hillsboro standard,
the tax benefit rule may be invoked if an event occurring in a sub-
sequent year is fundamentally inconsistent with the premise upon
which the prior year's deduction was based. That determination
requires an analysis of whether the prior year's deduction would
have been permitted had the subsequent event occurred in the
year of the deduction, taking into account the purpose and func-
tion of the provision allowing the earlier deduction.
Revenue Ruling 85-186 provides the following required analy-
sis in applying the Hillsboro standard. Legislative history indicates
that section 174 has two purposes: to encourage research and ex-
perimentation and to eliminate the necessity of allocation between
those research costs that are currently deductible and those prop-
erly chargeable to capital account. These purposes are considered
fulfilled in the year of the deduction, since it would be inconsistent
to grant relief from the requirement to allocate costs in the year of
the deduction only to impose it in the year in which the technology
is sold. It is concluded, therefore, that the subsequent sale of the
developed technology is an event of independent significance,
which is not fundamentally inconsistent with the purpose of the
See infra notes 43-44.
8 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
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prior deduction.
This analysis is instructive not only in confirming the inappli-
cability of the tax benefit rule to research and development ex-
penses currently deducted under section 174(a), but also to cur-
rently deductible development costs of other intangibles such as
circulation lists under section 173,' and trademarks and
tradenames under section 177.10 The legislative history1 of both
these provisions parallels that of section 174 in its intended allevi-
ation of the practical problems of allocation between those devel-
opment costs that are currently deductible and those that are
properly chargeable to capital account. With this similarity of leg-
islative history it would be difficult to justify a difference in result.
The ruling does, however, leave open the question of amortization
deductions taken pursuant to section 174(b). In that instance, the
application of the tax benefit rule must be reconciled with the de-
preciation recapture rules of section 1245.12
More importantly, Revenue Ruling 85-186 and its predecessor,
Revenue Ruling 72-528, both involve an economic recovery result-
ing from a sale rather than an event, as in HilIsboro, that of itself
does not require the recognition of income. Why then is the "fun-
damentally inconsistent event" standard of Hillsboro used, rather
than an analysis that seeks to resolve the issue, presented by the
facts of both rulings, of whether or not recognized income should
be recharacterized by application of the tax benefit rule? By failing
to address this issue directly, the ruling creates a degree of uncer-
tainty as to its scope, as well as to the possible continued applica-
tion of the tax benefit rule to recharacterize recognized income, at
least in those circumstances in which the transaction resulting in
the recognition of income constitutes a fundamentally inconsistent
event.
For example, suppose a taxpayer acquires the stock of corpo-
ration X for $100 plus an additional sum based on X's earnings
computed by the seller's accountant. That computation results in
an additional payment of $50. The X stock is sold later in the tax-
able year for $225 and a long term capital gain of $75 is reported.
Soon thereafter it is determined that the accountant miscalculated
the contingent portion of the purchase price and the taxpayer re-
See infra note 118.
30 See infra note 119.
' See infra note 120.
See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
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ceives a refund in the succeeding taxable year of a portion of the
original purchase price in the amount of $10. Must that refund be
reported as ordinary income pursuant to the tax benefit rule, or is
it merely an additional capital gain reflecting an adjustment to the
taxpayer's basis of the stock sold? Clearly the refund is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the gain as previously reported, since had
the refund been received in the same taxable year as the original
purchase and sale, it would have constituted an adjustment to the
basis of the stock and thereby increased the reportable capital
gain. Indeed, there is authority,13 on facts similar to these, that
applies the tax benefit rule to tax the refund as ordinary income.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the refund postulated in the
example should not result in ordinary income. The tax character of
the refund should be determined in a manner that is consistent
with the event to which it is related-the capital cost of the
stock-and not by arbitrarily classifying it as ordinary income be-
cause that income is recognized through application of the tax ben-
efit rule. In the example the need for a refund would not have oc-
curred but for the stock purchase and the two events are,
therefore, integrally related. Under these circumstances the ration-
ale of Arrowsmith v. Commissioner1 4 should be applied to charac-
terize the refund as capital gain rather than ordinary income, de-
spite the applicability of the tax benefit rule.15
This is wholly consistent with the application of the "funda-
mentally inconsistent event" test as applied in Revenue Ruling 85-
186, in which the sale of the technology was considered to have
significance independent of the deduction taken under section
174(a) for the development costs of that technology. Because the
sale was an independent event it was not inconsistent with the
prior deduction, and the tax benefit rule was held to be inapplica-
ble. Similarly, the lack of interdependence between the two events
destroys the relationship necessary under Arrowsmith for charac-
terizing the later transaction consistently with the earlier transac-
tion. Thus, under the facts of the ruling, the tax benefit rule is
inapplicable and the character of the gain recognized on the dispo-
' Mittelman v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1162 (1946).
14 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
" See Deely v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1081, 1096-97 (1980). In Deely, the Arrowsmith
rationale was applied to characterize the recovery of a non-business bad debt as a short
term capital gain rather than as ordinary income because the debt was initially deducted
under I.R.C. § 166(d) (West Supp. 1985) as a short term capital loss. See 73 T.C. at 1096-97.
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sition of the technology is determined by the tax characteristics of
that disposition, not by those of a prior event. When, however, the
deduction and subsequent recovery (or other fundamentally incon-
sistent events) are mutually interdependent, as in the example, the
rationale of Arrowsmith should be applied in conjunction with the
tax benefit rule to determine the character of the income recog-
nized. This is only appropriate, given that the object of both the
tax benefit rule and Arrowsmith is to provide transactional
equity.16
A variation of the example presents another question left un-
answered by the Service's reversal of position. Suppose the prop-
erty acquired by the taxpayer was depreciable property rather
than stock, that the rebate of $10 represents payment by the seller
with respect to a breach of a warranty, and that the rebate is re-
ceived by the taxpayer in the year following the purchase and a
subsequent resale. Assume further that the taxpayer deducted $30
of depreciation with respect to the property prior to resale. The
same issue of the tax character of the recovery is presented, but
the analysis is complicated by the fact that the taxpayer depreci-
ated the overstated basis prior to resale. Should the recovery be
taxed as ordinary income pursuant to the tax benefit rule? If so,
what consideration should be given to the ordinary income previ-
ously recognized at the time of disposition of the property pursu-
ant to the depreciation recapture rules? In this circumstance, the
depreciation recapture rules would have been applied to the sale of
the equipment in the earlier year, with the result that $30 of the
$105 aggregate gain would have been taxed at ordinary rates and
the $75 balance as long term capital gain. If, as a consequence of
the application of the tax benefit rule, the $10 recovery were taxed
as ordinary income rather than as capital gain, the result would
not conform to that which would have obtained had all of the
transactions occurred in a single taxable year-an unacceptable re-
sult if transactional equity is the effect desired.
If the $10 recovery is accorded capital gain treatment, how-
ever, the same result would be achieved as that which would have
occurred if all of the transactions had been consummated in the
earlier year of purchase-the result contemplated by Hillsboro in
the determination of what constitutes a "fundamentally inconsis-
tent event" and that desired as a matter of transactional equity. In
"6 Compare infra note 66 with note 101 and accompanying text.
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the latter circumstance, the taxpayer presumably would have re-
duced his basis in an amount equal to the $10 recovery and ad-
justed the amount of his depreciation deduction as a result of that
reduction in basis.17 Assuming that depreciation was reduced from
$30 to $28 as a result of the lower basis, the sale would have pro-
duced an aggregate gain of $113 (the selling price of $225 minus
the basis of $112 ($140 less depreciation of $28)) of which $28
would have been characterized as ordinary pursuant to the recap-
ture rules and the balance of $85 as capital gain. Precisely the
same capital gain would be recognized if the recovery is taxed at
capital rates when received in the later year; whereas, if the recov-
ery were taxed at ordinary rates pursuant to the tax benefit rule,
the taxpayer would recognize only $75 rather than $85 of capital
gain. Certainly the latter result more closely approximates transac-
tional equity than does the former.
The issue is complicated further if it is assumed that the sale
price of the equipment was $140 rather than $225. In that case, if
the recovery had occurred in the earlier year in which the sale took
place, the entire gain would have been attributable to the $28 of
depreciation properly deducted for that year. However, $30 of de-
preciation was in fact deducted and only a $20 gain, all taxable at
ordinary rates because of section 1245 recapture, was reported in
the year of sale. In the later year, the full $10 recovery should be
taxed as ordinary income, not by virtue of the tax benefit rule, but
by application of the Arrowsmith rationale. The result will then be
consistent with that intended by virtue of the application of the
depreciation recapture rules. An aggregate of $30 of ordinary in-
come will be recognized in both years. This amount is inconsistent
with the $28 of depreciation which would have been deducted and
recaptured as ordinary income if all the events had taken place in
the earlier year of purchase and resale. Nevertheless, the full $10
(not merely $8 of the recovery) should be taxed at ordinary rates in
the year of receipt. This is proper because $30 of depreciation was
in fact deducted and not the lesser hypothetical amount of $28,
which would have been deducted had the basis adjustment been
17 A result consistent with this approach has been achieved without reference to the tax
benefit rule in Freedom Newspapers Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1755 (1977), in
which Arrowsmith was applied to adjust the basis of property acquired in an earlier taxable
year. Id. at 1759; see also Bresler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 182, 187 (1975) (proceeds of
antitrust suit received as partial compensation in respect of prior sale of assets characterized
as ordinary income in reliance on Arrowsmith.)
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made in the earlier year of purchase and resale.
Thus, the reversal of position set forth in Revenue Ruling 85-
186 is a welcome first step, but it does not answer the broader
question of whether the tax benefit rule will be applied by the Ser-
vice to characterize arbitrarily all income recognized as a result of
the rule's application as ordinary in character. Further clarification
is necessary. Hopefully, it will be consistent with the thesis of this
Article, that tax benefit principles should not be so applied.
INTRODUCTION
The tax benefit rule"8 has long operated to reconcile the diffi-
18 The tax benefit rule is comprised of two elements, one which is statutory and exclu-
sionary in nature, and the other which is a product of judicial evolution and inclusionary in
character. The inclusionary element, providing that a deduction taken in a prior year should
be included as income for the year in which it is recovered, was first recognized by the
Internal Revenue Service in the context of recoupment of losses, typically the recovery of
bad debts previously deducted. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 405
(1983); Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARv. L. REV. 129, 131 n.10 (1943) [herein-
after cited as Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today]. The Bureau flip-flopped on the issue of
whether the inclusion was required only to the extent the taxpayer actually took or bene-
fited from the previous deduction. Initially it took the position that inclusion was required
even though no prior deduction had been taken. See Plumb, supra, at 131 (citing S.R. 2940,
IV-1 C.B. 129, 129-30 (1925)). The Service briefly reversed its position in G.C.M. 18525,
1937-1 C.B. 80, 83, but returned to its original position in G.C.M. 22163, 1940-2 C.B. 76, 80.
The inequity of requiring the inclusion regardless of whether the taxpayer benefited
from the prior deduction, or indeed whether he took the deduction at all, prompted Con-
gress to enact the exclusionary element of the rule as part of the Revenue Act of 1942, ch.
619, § 116, 56 Stat. 798, 812-13 (1942) (current version at I.R.C. § 111 (West Supp. 1985)),
which provided for inclusion only to the extent the taxpayer benefited from the earlier de-
duction. The current version of the statute, § 111, provides generally, for the exclusion from
income of a recovery of bad debts, taxes and delinquency amounts that, when initially de-
ducted, provided no tax benefit. For example, the recovery in 1985 of a bad debt deducted
in an earlier tax year in which the taxpayer reported a net operating loss, determined with-
out taking the bad debt deduction into account, would be excluded from income in the year
of recovery. Section 111 addresses only the exclusionary element of the rule but by implica-
tion ratifies the inclusionary component. See Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26
UCLA L. REV. 265, 271-72 (1978).
The Service has extended the reach of statute beyond the items specifically enumer-
ated. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a) (1956) extends the exclusionary, and by implication the inclu-
sionary, element of the rule to "all other losses, expenditures and accruals made the basis of
deductions from gross income for prior taxable years . . ." Id.; see Begley & Lancaster,
I.R.S. Rulings Could Pose Threat to R&D Limited Partnerships, 15 TAX ADVISER 716, 719
(1984); Bittker & Kanner, supra, at 271-72.
For the origins and subsequent development of the rule see generally Bittker & Kanner,
supra; Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Tomorrow, 57 HARv. L. REV. 675 (1944); Plumb, The
Tax Benefit Rule Today, supra; Tye, The Tax Benefit Rule Rexamined, 3 TAx L. REV. 329
(1948); White, An Essay on the Conceptual Foundations of the Tax Benefit Rule, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 486 (1984); Note, An Asset-Based Approach to the Tax Benefit Rule, 72 CAIEF. L.
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culties inherent in the use of an annual accounting period for in-
come reporting purposes and the often transactional nature of bus-
iness dealings that do not fit within such nicely delineated time
frames.19 As expressed by Judge Tannenwald, concurring in Estate
of Munter v. Commissioner:20
The most common, and most nearly accurate, explanation of
the rule is that it recognizes the "recovery" in the current year of
taxable income earned in an earlier year but offset by the item
deducted.2 1
The tax benefit rule is an acknowledgment that the recovery
of a previously deducted item does not readily conform to the con-
cept of economic gain necessary to the imposition of a tax.22 The
recovery of a prior year's deduction is included in income to "bal-
ance out" the prior benefit generated by the allowance of that de-
duction.23 Thus, it is a rule intended to achieve transactional par-
REV. 1257 (1984).
" See Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975) (Tannenwald, J.,
concurring).
The need to assess and collect taxes at fixed and relatively short intervals under-
pins the principle of taxation that transactions which may possibly be subject to
further developments substantially altering their character for tax purposes
should nevertheless be treated as final and closed so that their tax consequences
can be determined .... On the other hand, a taxpayer should not be permitted to
take advantage of this governmental exigency to establish a distorted picture of
his income for tax purposes. It is this countervailing consideration which spawned
the tax benifit rule.
Id. (Tannenwald, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
20 63 T.C. 663 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
11 Id. at 678 (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
2 See Bittker & Kanner, supra note 18, at 266. In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,
207 (1920), the Supreme Court defined "income" as the "gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined. . . ." Id. The repayment of a loan does not constitute in-
come within this definition since it represents a return of capital rather than a gain derived
from capital. The deduction of the amount of the loan as a bad debt in a year prior to
repayment does not, technically, alter the character of such repayment as a return of capi-
tal. However, a gain has been realized by virtue of the tax benefit derived from the bad debt
deduction. In National Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1940),
the court held that the prior deduction in these circumstances converts the debt from capi-
tal into a potential right to income which would be realized when the debt was repaid. Id. at
877.
21 See South Dakota Concrete Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1429 (1932). In
South Dakota Concrete, the Board of Tax Appeals acknowledged that an "adjustment" to
income was necessary to balance out the prior deduction. Id. at 1432. This is a recognition of
the transactional nature of the tax benefit rule, since a true balancing occurs naturally if the
recovery was received in the same taxable year as that in which the deduction was initially
claimed. Differences merely in the timing of the deduction and the recovery were not per-
mitted to impose substantially different tax results.
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ity in the recognition of income as between similarly situated
taxpayers, when differences exist only in the timing of events.2
But should this purpose of achieving transactional parity be ex-
tended not only to the recognition of income but also to the char-
acterization of income recognized, without resort to the tax benefit
rule?
For example, research and development costs may be de-
ducted as expenses of a trade or business in the year incurred even
though such expenditures might otherwise be capitalized.2 5 A suc-
At least two other theories, apart from the balancing of entries, have been advanced to
explain the inclusion of a recovery in income. In National Bank of Commerce v. Commis-
sioner, 115 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1940), the "transmutation of capital into income" theory was
stated as the transformation into income of the recovery of a deduction taken against in-
come in a prior year. See id. at 876-77. A more complicated viewpoint was expressed in
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Rothensies, 43 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1924), in which the recov-
ery of a previously deducted bad debt was conceded to be a return of capital, but was never-
theless held taxable on the theory of implied consent or waiver by the taxpayer. See id. at
925. For a more detailed explanation of these rationales, see generally Bittker & Kanner,
supra note 18, at 267-72.
2" See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 383 (1983). Absent the tax
benefit rule there is no transactional parity; a taxpayer who recoups his losses in the same
year in which they otherwise would have been subject to a deduction is treated unfairly as
compared with a taxpayer who takes a deduction of losses in one year and recoups them in a
later year, since only the latter would be entitled to the deduction. See id. at 383-84.
25 See I.R.C. § 174 (1982). Prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 174, deductions for re-
search and development were governed by § 23(a), the predecessor of § 162, which provided
deductions for "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business." Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 23(a), 45 Stat. 791, 799.
This phrase was then defined as "holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of
goods or services." Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Because new businesses had difficulty making such a showing, they often were not permit-
ted to take the deduction. Congress intended to remedy this with the less restrictive lan-
guage of § 174, which allows the deduction for expenses incurred "in connection with"
rather than in "carrying on" a trade or business. See 100 CONG. REc. 3425, 8998 (1954).
Section 174(a) provides in part:
(a) Treatment as expenses-
(1) In general.-A taxpayer may treat research or experimental expenditures which are
paid or incurred by him during the taxable year in connection with his trade or business as
expenses which are not chargeable to capital account. The expenditures so treated shall be
allowed as a deduction.
(2) When method may be adopted.-
(A) Without consent.-A taxpayer may, without the consent of the Secretary,
adopt the method provided in this subsection for his first taxable year...
(B) With consent.-A taxpayer may, with the consent of the Secretary, adopt
at any time the method provided in this subsection.
(3) Scope. -The method adopted under this subsection shall apply to all expenditures
described in paragraph (1). The method adopted shall be adhered to in computing taxable
income for the taxable year and for all subsequent taxable years unless, with the approval of
the Secretary, a change to a different method is authorized with respect to part or all of
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cessful research and development program eventually produces
valuable technology. The sale of that technology ordinarily is ac-
corded capital gain treatment, provided the requisite holding pe-
riod has been satisfied,2 and effects a "recovery" of the previously
deducted research and development costs that are reflected in the
value of the technology sold but not in its basis. This recovery is
taxed without resort to the tax benefit rule, since the recognized
capital gain is greater than it otherwise would have been by the
amount of the research and development costs that were deducted
rather than capitalized and included in basis. Thus, the true effect
of applying the tax benefit rule would, in these circumstances, be
to convert capital gain into ordinary income. This is a function for
which the tax benefit rule was neither intended nor appropriate.2 8
A. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS.
1. Revenue Ruling 75-52829
The initial published expression of the Service's position in
applying the tax benefit rule to the disposition of technology is
found in Revenue Ruling 75-528.3o In that ruling a pilot model was
such expenditures.
I.R.C. §174(a) (West Supp. 1985).
26 The disposition of property qualifies for long-term capital gain treatment provided
three requirements are satisfied: (1) the disposition is a sale or exchange; (2) the property, if
acquired after June 22, 1984, and before January 1, 1988, has been held for a period of six
months; and (3) the property sold or exchanged qualifies as a capital asset under I.R.C. §
1221. I.R.C. § 1222 (West Supp. 1985). Intangible personal property, including technology,
falls within the definition of a capital asset unless it is excluded as being property used in
the taxpayer's trade or business that is subject to the allowance for depreciation. In that
case it will nevertheless qualify for capital gain treatment pursuant to I.R.C. § 1231(a)
(West Supp. 1985). Only if such property is stock in trade, inventory, or property held for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business will I.R.C. § 1221 capital asset classifica-
tion and I.R.C. § 1231 capital gain treatment be denied. See LRC. § 1231(b)(1) (West Supp.
1985).
17 I.R.C. § 1016(a)(14) (West Supp. 1985) provides for adjustments to basis only with
respect to deferred expenses amortizable under I.R.C. § 174(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985). Ex-
penses currently deducted pursuant to I.R.C. § 174(a) may not also be capitalized, and
therefore, are not reflected in basis. See I.R.C. § 263(a)(7)(b) (West Supp. 1985); Commis-
sioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974) ("The purpose of § 263 is to reflect the basic
principle that a capital expenditure may not be deducted from current income").
28 Cf. Davis v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 881, 889-903 (1980), aff'd, 746 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.
1984). In Davis, tax benefit principles were asserted by the Commissioner in an unsuccessful
attempt to recharacterize a special allocation of partnership capital gain as ordinary income
to the recipient partner. See id. at 900-01.
2 Rev. Rul. 72-528, 1972-2 C.B. 481.
30 Id. at 481-82.
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developed as part of research and experimental activities con-
ducted in connection with the taxpayer corporation's business of
manufacturing various types of new machinery and equipment.
The costs of the pilot model were deducted in the year in which
they were incurred pursuant to section 174(a), and provided a tax
benefit. More than six months after having been placed in service,
the pilot model was completely destroyed by fire, and the taxpayer
was fully reimbursed for its loss by the proceeds of insurance.
The ruling concludes that the insurance proceeds must be
taxed at ordinary rather than capital rates to the extent of the de-
velopment costs previously deducted pursuant to Section 174
through application of the tax benefit rule. It recognizes that an
exception exists with respect to applying the rule to depreciation
expense,$' but distinguishes the section 174 expenditures from de-
preciation without analysis. The ruling apparently presumes a ba-
sis for such distinction in the perceived difference between depre-
ciation as the annual recovery of capital costs throughout the
extended time period of their utilization in the taxpayer's busi-
ness32 and the immediate recovery afforded research and develop-
ment expenditures through the allowance of a current deduction.3
31 See Tress. Reg. § 1.111-1(a) (1956). This depreciation expense exception is founded
on I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2), which requires that the basis of the property must be adjusted by the
depreciation allowed or allowable, which, in turn is determinative of the gain to be recog-
nized on the disposition of that property. See Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, supra
note 18, at 146-48. The principle was reflected in early decisions of the Supreme Court that
make it clear that this statutory determination of basis is made without consideration of tax
benefit. See, e.g., Virginia Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U.S. 523, 525 (1943) (basis adjust-
ment required for full amount of depreciation allowed, although only part of that deduction
had provided tax benefit); United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 304 (1927) (basis of prop-
erty adjusted by full amount of depreciation allowable, not merely lesser amount actually
allowed).
This exception to the application of the rule has been statutorily negated to the extent
that depreciation expense is now recaptured as ordinary income when there is a disposition
of the depreciable real or personal property with respect to which such deductions were
taken. See infra notes 43 and 44. But the exception remains in effect when the statutory
rules of recapture are inapplicable.
32 In United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927), the Court stated:
The depreciation charge permitted as a deduction from the gross income in
determining taxable income. . . for any year represents the reduction, during the
year, of the capital assets through wear and tear of the plant used. The amount of
the allowance for depreciation is the sum which should be set aside for the taxable
year, in order that, at the end of the useful life of the plant in the business, the
aggregate of the sums set aside will... suffice to provide an amount equal to the
original cost.
Id. at 301.
11 See I.R.C. § 174 (West Supp. 1985). Section 174 allows a taxpayer immediately to
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This distinction was recognized in a slightly different context
in Commissioner v. Anders.3 4 The revenue ruling cites Anders to
support application of the inclusionary aspect of the tax benefit
rule to section 162 expenses; the section 174 expenses are then
treated, at least inferentially, as being more akin to section 162
expenses than to exempted depreciation deductions. The issue in
Anders arose in the course of a corporate liquidation under section
337.35 Despite this non-recognition provision, the court applied the
tax benefit rule to override section 337 and to recognize ordinary
income on the sale of certain rental supplies that had a useful life
of between twelve to eighteen months but that had been expensed
upon acquisition." In requiring recognition of ordinary income
with respect to these expensed items, the court attributed the gain
realized on the sale solely to the previous deduction and not to any
increase in asset values. The proceeds of the sale attributable to
the expensed property were viewed as the recovery of the previ-
ously deducted cost of the property. These proceeds were treated
as ordinary income under tax benefit principles rather than as gain
qualifying for non-recognition pursuant to section 337.37
deduct from gross income all research and development expenditures incurred in connection
with the taxpayer's trade or business. See id.; Arem, Tax Benefits of Research and Develop-
ment Expenses Increased by New Credit, 10 TAX'N FOR LAW. 208, 208 (1982); Note, The
Tax Treatment of Research and Development Expenditures: A Comparison Between Fi-
nancial Accounting Standards and Section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code, 10 RUTGERs
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 149, 149 (1984). This deduction is an exception to the general rule
that current business expenditures that are expected to yield economic benefits in subse-
quent years must be amortized over those years. See Note, supra, at 149-50.
3- 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969).
5 See id. at 1285. I.R.C. § 337 provides that gain or loss generally will not be recog-
nized by a corporation that adopts a plan of liquidation and disposes of its property and
completely liquidates within twelve months thereafter. See I.R.C. § 337(a) (West Supp.
1985).
11 See 414 F.2d at 1287. The defendant's deductions were authorized pursuant to Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958), which permits the cost of materials and supplies to be deducted only
to the extent consumed during the taxable year for which the deduction is claimed, provided
they were not previously deducted. The cost of incidental materials and supplies may be
deducted when purchased rather than capitalized if no record of consumption or physical
inventory is maintained and the deduction does not materially distort income.
'7 See 414 F.2d at 1288-89; see also Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S.
370, 401 (1983) ("rule is now well established that the tax benefit rule overrides the nonrec-
ognition provision"); Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130, 1133 (3d Cir. 1972) ("tax
benefit principles apply to a § 337 transaction"); Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195,
197 (9th Cir. 1970) (tax benefit rule applies to § 337 fully expensed "property"); Bishop v.
United States, 324 F. Supp. 1105, 1110 (M.D. Ga. 1971) (tax benefit rule provides unstated
exception to nonrecognition of gain from sale of property accorded by § 337). An argument
could be made that the rental supplies in Anders were not incidental and thus were not
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The court specifically rejected the taxpayer's argument that
"the expense charges were the same as depreciation which is not
subject to recapture, and that the proceeds of the rental items
should be treated as gain from a sale above a depreciated basis at
zero . ,,.3 Agreeing that depreciable property was not subject to
tax under tax benefit principles, the court nevertheless, stated:
While some comparisons may be drawn between depreciation and
the charges to expense made by [the corporation] at purchase of
the rental items, we conclude that in substance the methods are
not the same. By charging to expense the full cost of the rental
items at purchase and not capitalizing them, there was no real
depreciation method employed . . .so as to qualify the disposi-
tion of the rental items for treatment as gain from a sale above a
depreciated basis. There was no realization of appreciation in
value entitled to such treatment.3 9
properly deductible in full in the year of acquisition. See Rev. Rul. 78-382, 1978-2 C.B. 111.
Nevertheless, since the acquisition cost of the supplies had been currently deducted, the
property had a zero basis, and the proceeds realized on disposition were considered a recov-
ery to the extent of the prior deduction, and taxable as ordinary income. See 414 F.2d at
1287-88.
31 414 F.2d at 1288. The taxpayer's argument was based on Fribourg Navigation Co. v.
Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272 (1966). In Fribourg, the taxpayer purchased a used Liberty
Ship in late 1955 and claimed depreciation expense using the straight line method. See id.
at 274. In 1957, the taxpayer adopted a plan of complete liquidation and thereafter sold the
ship for an amount in excess of both the original cost of the ship and its adjusted basis at
the commencement of the year of the sale. See id. This increase in value was caused by the
demand for ships resulting from the seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956. See id. The deprecia-
tion claimed for the year of sale was disallowed by the Commissioner on the theory that the
taxpayer should be permitted to recover only its "actual net cost" through deductions for
depreciation. See id. at 275-76. Because the sales price exceeded the adjusted basis at the
start of 1957, use of the ship during that year "cost" the taxpayer nothing. See id. at 276. In
rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Commissioner had improp-
erly "comingled two distinct and established concepts of tax accounting-depreciation of an
asset through wear and tear or gradual expiration of useful life and fluctuations in the value
of that asset through changes in price levels or market value." Id. Thus the Court recog-
nized what had been implicit in an earlier case, namely, that physical wear and tear as
represented by depreciation deductions did not also reflect fluctuations in market value. See
United States v. Ludley, 274 U.S. 295 (1927). This, in turn, provides a rationale for exclud-
ing the gain realized on the disposition of depreciable property from application of the tax
benefit rule. While depreciation is an appropriate adjustment to the basis of depreciable
property in determining gain, such gain may reflect fluctuations in market value rather than
depreciation previously deducted. In other words, the increase in value resulting from
changes in pricing levels caused by market factors may exceed the decline in value repre-
sented by physical wear and tear. As such, the gain realized does not necessarily represent a
recovery of depreciation expense, and in the absence of a recovery, application of the tax
benefit rule is inappropriate.
39 414 F.2d at 1288.
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The similarity between the current deduction allowed for re-
search and development expenses under section 174(a) and the
current expense permitted for short-lived assets under the section
162 regulations involved in Anders is, however, more superficial
than real, and does not provide support for the conclusion reached
in Revenue Ruling 72-528.
The underlying assumption made in Anders, as evidenced by
the last quoted sentence and by the section 162 regulations, is that
a material fluctuation will not occur in the value of short-lived as-
sets.40 This assumption is simply not factually accurate as applied
to the intellectual content of technology, whether or not the costs
of development of that property are currently expensed under sec-
tion 174(a). Such value is not ordinarily related in any specific or
recognizable way to the level of cost incurred in its development.
Technology is developed precisely for extended use in business and
its value is tied to the market factors that impact on how the spe-
cific capabilities of that technology satisfy such use. As in Fribourg
Navigation Co. v. Commissioner,41 realization of the value of that
technology is independent of the prior development expense. To
that extent the deduction of these development costs bears a closer
resemblance to depreciation than to expensed supplies, and should
be accorded the same exception to application of the tax benefit
rule. Stated differently, depreciation as a method of recovering
capital costs is unrelated to the continuing value of that invest-
ment in capital. Research and development expenditures, as costs
of creating capital, similarly have no relationship to the value of
the technology created.
Thus, Revenue Ruling 72-528 should be viewed as providing
the proper result only if it is limited to its specific facts.42 Since the
40 Inventories of supplies and similarly expensed items are acquired for consumption in
the relatively short term. See Rev. Rul. 68-104, 1968-1 C.B. 361 (cost of rental diapers with
average useful life of less than one year deductible as ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense); Tress. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1958) (capital expenditures include property having use-
ful life substantially beyond taxable year). Given the nature of most supplies and the fact of
short term utilization in the business, there is little likelihood of significant appreciation.
Even in those instances in which a supply item, such as cattle feed, may appreciate in value
due to fluctuations in commodity prices, the importance of such fluctuations would appear
to be insignificant in comparison to the need for consumption of that item in the business.
Cf. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 395 (1983) (business expense de-
duction predicated on consumption of asset in trade or business).
41 383 U.S. 272 (1966); see supra note 38.
42 If Rev. Rul. 72-528 is limited to its specific facts, the result reached in the ruling may
be justified, at least in part, by use of an alternative rationale. The Treasury Regulations
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pilot model was totally destroyed, the technology represented in
and by the model was not transferred for value. The insurance pro-
ceeds presumably were reimbursement only for the development
cost of the pilot model and not for the market value of the inher-
ent intellectual content. As such, the proceeds could be viewed
merely as the recovery of the previously deducted costs of a con-
sumed asset akin to the supplies in Anders.
If not so limited, Revenue Ruling 72-528 appears suspect in
terms of its lack of consistency with existing congressional policy
and judicial authority. After section 174 was enacted as part of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the depreciation recapture provi-
sions of sections 1245"3 and 1250"4 were introduced into the Code
without comparable modifications for the recapture of research
and development costs. 45 More importantly, the single legislative
provide that some of the costs of development of depreciable property are not deductible
under I.R.C. § 174 even though such property may be used in connection with research and
experimentation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1742(b)(2), (4). These costs include the costs of compo-
nent materials of depreciable property, the costs of labor or other elements involved in its
construction and installation, and costs attributable to the acquisition or improvement of
the property. See id. § 1.174-2(b)(4). Thus, it is possible that at least part of the costs of the
pilot model involved in Rev. Rul. 72-528 included these excluded costs and should have
been charged to capital account and depreciated rather than deducted. If this were true, the
expensed costs would have been taken in lieu of proper depreciation. The recapture provi-
sions of I.R.C. § 1245, and not the tax benefit rule, would then be applied to recover those
costs as ordinary income. See infra note 43.
"' Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 13(a), 76 Stat. 960, 1032 (1962). I.R.C. §
1245 applies, generally, to convert the proceeds of a disposition of depreciable personal
property from capital gain to ordinary income to the extent of the lesser of the gain realized
or the depreciation expense previously deducted with respect to such property. For an ex-
planation of the operation of this provision as it pertains to the recapture of research and
development costs deducted under § 174, see infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
" Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 231(a), 78 Stat. 19, 100. I.R.C. § 1250
applies, generally, to convert the proceeds of a disposition of real property from capital gain
to ordinary income to the extent of the lesser of gain realized or the excess of accelerated
depreciation deducted with respect to such property over the deduction which would have
been available using the straight line method of depreciation.
" Section 1252 of the Code, enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
172, § 214, 83 Stat. 487, 572, applies, generally, to convert the proceeds of a disposition of
farm land from capital gain to ordinary income, to the extent of the lesser of the gain real-
ized or a designated percentage (which varies with the period the land has been held prior
to the disposition) of the previously deducted costs incurred under I.R.C. § 175 (relating to
farmers' land clearing expenditures). Section 1254 of the Code, enacted in the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 205(a), 90 Stat. 1525, 1533, applies, generally, to convert
the proceeds of a disposition of oil, gas, or geothermal property from capital gain to ordinary
income to the extent of the lesser of the gain realized or the intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs previously deducted in respect of the property under I.R.C. § 263(c).
In each instance, prior to the statutory enactment, the pertinent deduction was not
subject to recapture as provided in I.R.C. § 1245. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st
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effort to provide for broader application of the recapture provi-
sions of section 1245, if enacted, would have provided for recapture
of the "purchase price" of property that had been properly ex-
pensed, but would not have embraced the recovery of research and
development costs deducted pursuant to section 174(a).46 The
House Report specifically stated:
Under the bill, the recapture rules are to apply only where
the "purchase price" of property is deducted. These rules are not
intended to apply, for example, to research and development ex-
penses (allowed as a deduction under sec. 174), even though these
expenses might be viewed as a "cost" of developing certain
property.
47
Judicial precedent is also consistent in failing to characterize
any part of the proceeds from a sale of technology as ordinary in-
come based on application of the tax benefit rule.48 If ordinary in-
Sess. 89 n.1 (1975). The enactment of each of these statutory rules of recapture would have
been unnecessary had the expenses been subject to the same result through application of
the tax benefit rule. Absent a specific statutory enactment, with respect to research and
development costs deducted under LR.C. § 174, whose similarity to the deductions specified
in I.R.C. §§ 1252 and 1254 is manifest, such expenses would also appear to be excluded from
application of the tax benefit rule.
,6 See H.R. 10936, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 38212 (1975).
47 TA TREATMENT UPON DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY FOR WHICH A BusINSS DEDUCTION
WAS ALLOWED, HR. REP. No. 1350, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976). The same language is
repeated in TAx TREATMENT UPON DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY FOR WHICH A BUSINESS DEDUC-
TION WAS ALLOWED, S. REP. No. 1346, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976). Each report continues:
"Also, the rules under the bill are not to apply to intangible drilling and development costs
(allowed as a deduction under section 263(c))." HR. REP. No. 1350, supra, at 2; S. REP. No.
1346, supra, at 2. The fact that I.R.C. § 1254 was enacted specifically to recapture intangible
drilling costs, and no comparable provision was enacted to recapture research and develop-
ment costs though both were viewed as involving the same issue, evidences an intention to
permit the deduction of research and development costs under I.R.C. § 174 against ordinary
income without the threat of recapture, despite the availability of capital gain treatment for
the proceeds of sale of the resulting technology.
48 Compare Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. v. United States, 591 F.2d 652, 658-65 (Ct.
Cl. 1979) (transfer of patent rights and know-how for transferees' exclusive use constituted
"sale" for purposes of long term capital gain treatment) and Davis v. Commissioner, 31
T.C.M. (CCH) 1162 (1972) (patent application not allowed by patent office until 10 months
after sale of patent not depreciable property and proceeds from sale entitled to capital gain
treatment), afl'd per curiam, 491 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1974) and United States Mineral Prods.
Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 177, 198 (1969) (proceeds derived from sale of know-how, pat-
ents, and trademarks held taxable at capital gain rates) and The Hell Co. v. Commissioner,
38 T.C. 989, 1003 (1962) (proceeds derived from sale of heavy machinery patents taxable at
capital gain rate) with E.L du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct.
Cl. 1961) (sale of gas in pressurized cylinder not entitled to capital gain treatment on excess
of forfeited deposit for cylinders over their adjusted basis) and Taylor-Winfield Corp. v.
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 205 (1971) (transfer that did not constitute sale of "all substantial
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come is imposed with respect to a disposition of technology, such
characterization results from a failure to satisfy the sale or ex-
change requirement and not through an attempt to recapture pre-
viously deducted development costs. In only one case has the sale
of technology resulted in the imposition of a tax at ordinary rates
as a consequence of applying the tax benefit rule to previously de-
ducted research and development expenses.49
In Altec Corp. v. Commissioner,50 a corporation engaged in the
distribution and sale of electronic products, adopted a plan of com-
plete liquidation pursuant to section 337 and then sold its assets.
Included in the sale were previously expensed drawings, tooling,
and artwork used in the development and sale of amateur radio
kits. Pursuant to an independent appraisal, these expensed assets
were allotted a reproduction cost of $1,015,000 and a market value
based on continued use in the business of $623,700. The latter
amount was recorded as the cost of these assets on the books of
account of the purchaser and subsequently depreciated. In holding
that the tax benefit rule applied to these expensed assets, the Tax
Court relied on its prior decision in Anders, and required the sell-
ing corporation to include $623,700 of the purchase price as ordi-
nary income despite the non-recognition requirements of section
337.51 The court did not consider-in fact probably did not per-
ceive-any differences between the items of expensed laundry sup-
plies involved in Anders and the expensed technology found in Al-
tec. This view may be entirely appropriate depending upon the
interpretation given to the facts.
It is unclear whether, as in Revenue Ruling 72-528, it can be
argued that there was no intellectual value attributable to the
drawings, tooling and artwork. Some support can be found for this
rights" to know-how not accorded capital gain treatment) and Commercial Solvents Corp. v.
Commissioner, 42 T.C. 455, 468-69 (1964) (no capital gain treatment when transferor re-
tained some rights in secret process), acq. 1965-1 C.B. 4 (ordinary income resulted from
failure to satisfy sale or exchange requirement). See generally Di Bernardo, The 'Taxation
of High Technology, 61 TAXES 813, 821-27 (1983).
" See Altec Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1805 (1977).
:0 Id.
' See id. at 1804-05. Because the disposition occurred in the context of an I.R.C. § 337
liquidation, gain would not have been recognized absent the Altec court's application of the
tax benefit rule to recapture the proceeds from the sale of the technology as ordinary in-
come. Therefore, the case represents the question of recognition versus non-recognition typ-
ical of the tax benefit rule. It is difficult to appraise its precedential value to a sale transac-
tion outside the context of a non-recognition provision, which would raise the issue of
characterization rather than recognition of income.
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view since the $623,700 fair market value of these assets was less
than their $1,015,000 cost of reproduction. As such, the view taken
by the Tax Court may have been that the sale merely recovered
prior production costs. Since a recovery of the value of the intellec-
tual content of technology, rather than a recovery of the produc-
tion costs of technical renderings of that technology, is the basis
for distinguishing depreciable property from expensed assets, its
perceived absence from the factual context of Altec might permit
the drawings and tooling to be taxed as ordinary income pursuant
to the tax benefit rule. However, this is a great deal to read into
the opinion. It is at least as likely that the appraised market value
represented the intellectual content of the technology, not merely
its mechanical renderings, and that an analogy to depreciable
property is appropriate, thereby rendering the tax benefit rule
inapplicable.
2. Technical Advice Memorandum 840900952
Despite the lack of judicial and Congressional support, the
next expression of the Service's position with respect to the recap-
ture of research and development expenses pursuant to tax benefit
principles was more expansive in scope. In this technical advice
memorandum the Service relied upon the legislative history of sec-
tion 17453 and the rationale of the Supreme Court in Hillsboro Na-
tional Bank v. Commissioner54 to justify application of the tax
benefit rule to research and development expenses. On analysis,
however, neither the legislative history of section 174 nor the Hills-
boro decision justifies the recapture of previously deducted re-
search and development costs at the time the underlying technol-
ogy is sold.
In 8409009, the taxpayer was engaged in extensive, in-house
research and development to develop both patented and unpat-
ented technology for use in its business. An occasional sale or other
disposition occurred only when the technology no longer suited the
taxpayer's long-term strategy of product offerings. The three dis-
positions in question were made for valid business reasons and
each constituted a sale of all of the taxpayer's substantial rights in
the technology. They qualified, therefore, for capital gain treat-
2 IRS Letter Ruling 8409009 (11/23/83).
53 See id.; see also infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
460 U.S. 370 (1983).
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ment under either section 1221 as to the "know how" or unpat-
ented technology, 55 or section 1231 as to the patented technology.56
In each instance the basis of the transferred technology was zero
because the development costs had been deducted pursuant to sec-
tion 174(a). The technical advice memorandum applied the tax
benefit rule to each transaction, taxing the proceeds of sale as ordi-
nary income to the extent of the previously deducted research and
development expenses that had resulted in a tax benefit. Any re-
maining proceeds were accorded capital gain treatment.
(a) Legislative History
The technical advice memorandum determined that the pur-
pose of section 174(a) in providing a current deduction for research
and development costs was to avoid the necessity of determining
the useful life of the technology thereby created. It concludes that,
for purposes of applying the tax benefit rule, all expensed research
and development costs, whether or not the resulting technology
has a useful life in excess of one year, should be treated in the
same manner as a current deduction permitted under the section
162 regulations.5 7 This analysis is flawed because it is based on an
11 See, e.g., Davis v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1974). In Davis, the taxpayer
acquired all of an investor's interest in an apparatus designed to skin sausages. See id. at
710. Subsequently, the inventor executed an application for a letter patent on the invention.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that despite the fact that the patent appli-
cation was not allowed by the patent office until 10 months after the sale of the inventor's
interest, the property was not depreciable and proceeds from the sale were entitled to capi-
tal gain treatment under § 1221. See id.; see also Lan Jen Chu v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 598
(1972) (assignment of patent application held not to produce ordinary income), aff'd, 486
F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1973); Estate of Stahl v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 591 (1969) (sale of patent
application is non-depreciable property subject to the provisions of § 1221), aff'd, 442 F.2d
324 (7th Cir. 1971).
50 See Armco Steel Corp. v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Ohio 1966). In appro-
priate circumstances the disposition of a patent by a "holder," generally the creator of the
patent, may also qualify for capital gain treatment pursuant to I.R.C. § 1235 (West Supp.
1985). Capital gain treatment for patented technology is also permissible under I.R.C. §
1221. See United States v. Dresser, 324 F.2d 56, 59-61 (5th Cir. 1963) (sale of right to oil
well surveying patent constituted capital gain); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 136 F.
Supp. 818, 826 (D.N.J. 1955) (sale of patents by amateur inventor considered sale of capital
asset under I.R.C. § 1221).
57 See IRS Letter Ruling 8409009 (11/23/83). The ruling states in part:
When Congress substituted a current deduction under section 162 for R & D ex-
penditures with the option of a current deduction under section 174(a)(1), it did
not indicate that the tax benefit rule, which applies to certain expenditures de-
ducted under 162, would not apply to section 174(a)(1). We believe that, once a
taxpayer chooses to deduct R & D expenses currently under section 174(a)(1),
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erroneous factual assumption. Developed technology with an ex-
tended useful life will not ordinarily be consumed or used in the
taxpayer's business within a short period of time, and the effect of
applying the tax benefit rule to such technology would be to re-
cover values created by market considerations rather than the ac-
tual costs of development.
An examination of the legislative history reveals a practical
resolution to a factual issue concerning the determination of useful
life that places section 174 in closer proximity to a depreciation
type recovery of costs pursuant to section 167, than to the eco-
nomic assumptions underlying section 162. The Senate Committee
Report explains the purpose of section 174 as follows:
No specific treatment is authorized by present law for re-
search and experimental expenditures. To the extent that they
are ordinary and necessary they are deductible; to the extent that
they are capital in nature they are to be capitalized and amor-
tized over useful life. Losses are permitted where amounts have
been capitalized in connection with abandoned projects, and re-
covery through amortization is provided where the useful life of
these capital items is determinable, as in the case of a patent.
However, where projects are not abandoned and where a useful
life cannot be definitely determined, taxpayers have had no
means of amortizing research expenditures.
To eliminate uncertainty and to encourage taxpayers to carry
on research and experimentation the House and your committee's
bill provide that these expenditures ... may, at the option of the
taxpayer, be treated as deductible expenses. It also provides that
a taxpayer may elect to capitalize such expenditures and if no
other means of amortization is provided, may write them off over
'a period of not less than 60 months, beginning with the month in
which benefits are first realized.58
Thus, the enactment of section 174 was not intended to affect
those development costs that were otherwise required to be capi-
talized and amortized over a determinable useful life. Permission
to deduct those costs currently rather than to amortize them
merely affected the timing of the deduction. With respect to tech-
such deduction should not be treated differently, for purposes of the tax benefit
rule, from a section 162 dedcution under prior law.
Id.
58 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
N.ws 4621, 4663-64.
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nology with a determinable useful life, the grant of a current de-
duction is in the nature of a special accelerated allowance as an
alternative to amortization under section 167. Certainly, section
174 was not intended to provide a tax result less beneficial than
that available under preexisting law with respect to the costs of
technology having a determinable useful life, one that would dis-
courage rather than encourage research and experimentation con-
trary to the avowed purpose of section 174. But precisely such an
adverse result would obtain if the current deduction allowed under
section 174(a) was subjected to recapture at ordinary rates through
application of the tax benefit rule. The deduction for amortization
available under section 167, on the other hand, remained within
the recognized exception to such recapture afforded depreciation
expense.59
Whether research and development costs are currently ex-
pensed or amortized, their inherent nature and the technology de-
rived therefrom do not differ; only the period over which the costs
are recovered is different. A change in the period of recovery of
these costs does not alter their intrinsic nature; they continue to
have a value that is subject to market factors and rising price
levels. The latter factors are present with respect to depreciable
property but are not presumed to be present with respect to short-
lived assets, which may be currently expensed pursuant to the
Regulations under section 162.80 Because of this fundamental dif-
ference, the tax benefit rule should not be applied to recapture
currently deductible research and development costs. Rather, in
the absence of a statutorily mandated requirement for recapture,
59 Until the enactment of I.R.C. § 1245, eight years after the passage of LR.C. § 174(a),
research and development costs of technology with a determinable useful life were amortiza-
ble under I.R.C. § 167, and would have been encompassed within the recognized exception
to application of the tax benefit rule accorded depreciation expense. See Commissioner v.
Anders, 414 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969); supra notes
36-42 and accompanying text. It would have been logically inconsistent to preclude applica-
tion of the tax benefit rule to amortization taken pursuant to I.R.C. § 167 in respect of
technology with a determinable useful life while applying it to recapture a current deduction
allowed in lieu thereof under I.R.C. § 174(a) with respect to such technology.
The enactment of I.R.C. § 1245 created an anomoly in that amortization pursuant to
I.R.C. § 167 of capitalized research and development costs with respect to technology with a
determinable life is now subject to recapture. But that anomolous result can be avoided by
deducting these research and development costs under I.R.C. § 174(a) rather than capitaliz-
ing and amortizing them under I.R.C. § 167. Availability of this election is not a reason to
extend the reach of the tax benefit rule to recapture currently expensed research and devel-
opment costs not within the ambit of statutory depreciation recapture.
'0 See supra note 46.
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those costs should be accorded the same exemption from tax bene-
fit recapture as depreciable property under section 111 and ex-
isting judicial precedent.6 1 The accelerated write off was intended
as an incentive to further research, and it should not be adminis-
tratively altered to provide a contrary result by allowing recapture
of expenditures at ordinary income rates.
(b) Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner
Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner62 is the consolida-
tion on appeal of two cases, each of which presents the question of
whether a true economic recovery is necessary to apply the tax
benefit rule or whether the rule may be applied on the basis of
subsequent events that prove the premise underlying a prior year's
deduction to have been erroneous. 3
In Hillsboro, the first case, the State of Illinois imposed a
property tax on Illinois bank shares held by individuals. This tax
was customarily paid by the bank and deducted pursuant to sec-
tion 164(e). In 1970, the minois constitution was amended to pro-
hibit the imposition of that tax. The amendment was promptly
challenged as unconstitutional. Pending disposition of this chal-
lenge, Illinois passed a law permitting collection of the tax and its
placement in escrow. Eventually, the constitutional challenge was
defeated and the appropriate portion of these amounts plus ac-
crued interest was paid to Hillsboro's shareholders. The Commis-
sioner included these amounts as income to the bank.
In the second case, Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States,64 the
taxpayer purchased and properly deducted the cost of cattle feed
for its fiscal year ending June 30, 1972. Two days into the suc-
ceeding fiscal year, Bliss adopted a plan of complete liquidation,
distributing its assets, including the unconsumed cattle feed, to
shareholders. Bliss did not report any income from the liquidation,
relying on the non-recognition provisions of section 336.65 The
61 See Anders, 414 F.2d at 1289 (rental items already fully expensed not subject to
capital gain treatment).
62 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
'3 See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 460
U.S. 370 (1983); Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub
nom. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983), on remand, Bliss Dairy,
Inc. v. United States, 704 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir. 1983).
460 U.S. 370 (1983).
" Bliss, 645 F.2d at 20; see I.R.C. § 336 (West Supp. 1985). Section 336 provides that,
with certain exceptions, "no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribu-
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Commissioner contested the corporation's treatment of the liqui-
dation and asserted that the value of the unconsumed feed distrib-
uted in liquidation had to be included in Bliss' income.
In each of these cases, the taxpayer asserted that an economic
recovery was necessary for application of the tax benefit rule while
the government argued that the presence of an event inconsistent
with the basis for claiming that prior deduction was sufficient.
While rejecting the necessity for an economic recovery, the Su-
preme Court also disagreed with the government's formulation and
forged its own concept of the fundamentally inconsistent event
needed to invoke the tax benefit rule. The Court stated:
Not every unforseen event will require the taxpayer to report in-
come in the amount of his earlier deduction. On the contrary, the
tax benefit rule will "cancel out" an earlier deduction only when a
careful examination shows that the later event is indeed funda-
mentally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduction
was initially based. That is, if the event had occurred within the
same taxable year, it would have foreclosed the deduction."6
tion of property in complete liquidation." I.R.C. § 336(a); cf. Williamson v. United States,
292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (parallel provisions of the I.R.C., namely §§ 311 and 336, state
that no gain should be recognized on distribution of property in liquidation).
The most prominent exception to this rule is the anticipatory assignment doctrine de-
veloped in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). In Horst, the taxpayer, an owner of
negotiable bonds, detached the negotiable interest coupons from the bonds before their
maturation date, and delivered them to his son as a gift. In ruling that the taxpayer had
realized gain, even though the income was received by his son, the Supreme Court held that
"[t]he power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it. The exercise of that
power to procure the payment of income to another is the enjoyment, and hence the realiza-
tion, of the income by him who excercises it." Id. at 118. This doctrine has been followed in
the application of I.R.C. § 336. See Cummins Diesel Sales of Colorado Co. v. United States,
263 F. Supp. 677, 685 (D. Colo. 1967) (assignment to sole shareholder of corporation's right
under contract, which fulfilled the corporation's mission, was constructive receipt of income
by corporation); Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524, 530 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (distribution
of accounts receivable to sole shareholder which had fixed right to future payment was reali-
zation of income, taxable to corporation).
66 Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 383-84. The Court noted that the purpose of the tax benefit
rule was not merely to tax recoveries, but to "approximate the results produced by a tax
system based on transactional rather than annual accounting." Id. at 381; see Estate of
Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975) (tax benefit rule as "necessary counter-
weight to the consequences of the annual accounting principle"); Barnett v. Commissioner,
39 B.T.A. 864, 867 (1939) ("When some event occurs which is inconsistent with a deduction
taken in a prior year, adjustment may have to be made by reporting a balancing item in
income for the year in which the change occurs"). The Hillsboro Court observed that the
taxpayers' definition of recovery as "economic gain" was not consistent with the purpose of
the statute. See 460 U.S. at 382; see also Zysman, Income Derived from the Recovery of
Deductions, 19 TAXEs 29, 30 (1941) (rule deals not with "a theoretical or pure economic
concept of income, but with gross income within the meaning of the statute"). The Court
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By way of illustration, the Court used the example of a cur-
rently deductible rental payment made on December 15, for a
thirty-day lease, and the destruction of the building by fire on Jan-
uary 10, of the succeeding year. It then compared the destruction
with a taxpayer's conversion of the same building from business to
personal use. While the destruction by fire was considered an ac-
cepted risk of the business, and thus not a fundamentally inconsis-
tent event, the conversion from business to personal use was incon-
sistant. The Supreme Court's analysis requires not only a
fundamentally inconsistent event, but also when that event occurs
in the context of a non-recognition transaction as in Bliss, a fur-
ther determination as to whether the applicable non-recognition
provision or the tax benefit rule prevails.67
Applying these principles to Hillsboro, the Court determined
that the legislative purpose of section 164(e) was to grant relief to
the corporation upon payment of the shareholder tax. The focus of
Congress was on the act of payment, not on the use to which the
funds were put by the state. The state's refund to the bank's
shareholders, therefore, was not viewed as fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the premise upon which the deduction was initally taken.
Thus, the bank was not required to recognize income pursuant to
the tax benefit rule and the decision below was reversed.
In Bliss, the Court held that the distribution of the expensed
cattle feed to shareholders in liquidation of the corporation was
the analogue of conversion of property from business to personal
use and, as such, required the amount of the previous deduction
taken with respect to the unconsumed feed to be included in in-
come. The Court also held that the non-recognition provisions of
section 336 provided a shield to the taxation of market apprecia-
tion and were not a bar to the recognition of other types of income
as exemplified by the well-settled precedent of applying the tax
also noted that application of the taxpayers' proposal would formalize the application of the
tax benefit rule and thereby narrow its scope, thus conflicting with established case author-
ity. See 460 U.S. at 382-83.
"' See 460 U.S. at 391. See generally Byrne, The Tax Benefit Rule as Applied to Cor-
porate Liquidations and Contributions to Capital-Recent Developments, 56 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 215 (1980); Feld, The Tax Benefit of Bliss, 62 B.U.L. Rav. 443 (1982); O'Hare, Statu-
tory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Benefit Sale in the
Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27 TAX. L. REv. 215 (1972); Yin, Supreme
Court's Tax Benefit Rule Decision: Unanswered Questions Invite Future Litigation, 59 J.
TAX'N 130 (1983); Note, Tax Treatment of Previously Expensed Assets in Corporate Liqui-
dations, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1636 (1982).
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benefit rule to section 337 liquidations. The latter section was con-
sidered a companion non-recognition provision intended to provide
the same tax results as section 336 in related circumstances.
The Service's reliance in the technical advice memorandum on
the "fundamentally inconsistent event" test of Hillsboro was mis-
placed for a number of reasons. Initially, Hillsboro must be viewed
as involving the question of whether or not income is to be recog-
nized in the absence of an economic recovery. The technical advice
memorandum, however, involved an economic recovery in which
the issue is not whether income should be recognized but rather
whether clearly recognizable income should be characterized as
capital gain or ordinary income. The inconsistent event analysis of
Hillsboro does not focus on the issue of income characterization
and should not have been so applied. Moreover, there is nothing
fundamentally inconsistent in the recognition of income at capital
gain rates merely because the expenses or costs incurred in the
generation of that income were deducted against ordinary income.
The provisions of section 1250 are an example. That section taxes
the gain recognized on the sale or exchange of certain real property
at ordinary income rates to the extent that accelerated deprecia-
tion taken with respect to such property exceeds straight line de-
preciation. Section 1250 is silent as to the balance of the gain,
which is ordinarily taxed at capital gain rates pursuant to either
section 1221 or section 1231.8 Extension of the Service's position
adopted in the technical advice memorandum to that portion of
the gain attributable to straight line depreciation would subject
such depreciation to tax at ordinary rates, since the deduction was
initially taken against ordinary income, and would be treated by
the technical advice memorandum as fundamentally inconsistent
with reporting the gain at capital gain rates. It is unlikely that the
Service would seriously advance that contention, or if advanced
that it would gain judicial favor, because it would vitiate the provi-
sions of sections 1221 and 1231.69
68 Prior to 1976, I.R.C. § 1250 did refer to I.R.C. § 1231. See I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1)(B)
(amended 1976). The requirements for the capital gain treatment of the disposition of de-
preciable property are equally applicable to nondepreciable property in the absence of de-
preciation recapture under I.R.C. § 1245 (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 26.
69 See supra notes 43-44 for the statutory basis underlying characterization of gain real-
ized on the sale of depreciable property. I.R.C. §§ 1245 and 1250, concerning the sale or
other disposition of depreciable property, allow for the recapture of depreciation taken prior
to the disposition of an asset. Thus, to the extent of the depreciation taken, any gain on the
disposition of such property is taxable as ordinary income. See Fribourg Navy Co. v. Com-
[Vol. 60:26
TAX BENEFIT RULE
Similarly, the interest expense incurred to purchase an invest-
ment asset is deductible against ordinary income. The Service has
not attempted to apply the tax benefit rule to tax as ordinary in-
come a portion of the gain upon disposition of the investment as-
set. To do so would appear to be an unwarranted attempt to ex-
tend rules similar to those of section 265,0 as they relate to the
acquisition of certain investment assets, to a much broader range
of assets without an appropriate statutory foundation. Finally,
there is authority for taxing the proceeds of a sale of technology at
capital gain rates when the factual context clearly indicates that
the costs of development were expensed against ordinary income.7
Nevertheless, the technical advice memorandum concluded
that taxation of the proceeds of sale of technology at capital gain
rates was fundamentally inconsistent with prior current deductions
of the costs of development of that technology pursuant to section
174(a). It reasoned that the allowance of a current deduction for
research and development costs was equivalent to their treatment
as section 162 expenses, and thereby subjected them to the same
presumption of short-term consumption upon which section 162
deductions are premised. The value of expensed technology was
missioner, 335 F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 272 (1966).
Capital gain under I.R.C. §§ 1221 and 1231, however, does not fall within the scope of
I.R.C. §§ 1245 and 1250. To treat gain realized under §§ 1231 and 1221 as ordinary income
rather than capita] gain would be to disregard the exception to the application of the tax-
benefit rule afforded depreciation expense, which existed prior to the introduction of statu-
tory depreciation recapture. Presumably, this exception continues to exist to the extent that
I.R.C. §§ 1245 and 1250 are inapplicable.
70 I.R.C. § 265 disallows the deduction of interest on an indebtedness incurred by the
taxpayer for the purpose of purchasing tax-exempt obligations. See Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1
C.B. 740. When the taxpayer's investment in tax-exempt obligations is substantial, or when
the indebtedness incurred is for personal consumption or within the active conduct of trade
or business, it will not normally be inferred that the purpose of carrying a debt is to finance
tax-exempt obligations. See id. at 741. If these circumstances are not present, a presumption
is created that the indebtedness was incurred to finance the tax-exempt obligations. To
deny a deduction for interest incurred with respect to a debt, Treas. Reg. § 1.265-2 and Rev.
Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 C.B. 740, require a tracing of the proceeds of the indebtedness to the
purchase or carrying of tax-exempt obligations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.265-2; Rev. Proc. 72-18,
1972-1 C.B. 740.
For a rule similar to I.R.C. § 265 to be applicable with respect to the interest expense
incurred to purchase an investment asset, a causal connection between the interest deduc-
tion and the subsequent sale of the investment asset would have to be shown. See infra note
101.
7, See Hell Co. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 989, 1003 (1962) (sale of patents, manufactur-
ing and engineering information held to be taxable as long term capital gain); Golconda
Corp. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 506, 510 (1957) (sale of patent for cutting saw held to be
transfer of capital asset).
19851
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
then likened to the unconsumed cattle feed distributed in Bliss,
thereby requiring the same tax result. As discussed, this assump-
tion of short-term consumption was totally inappropriate to tech-
nology.7 2 Moreover, the analysis failed to consider the difference in
the tax characteristics between unconsumed cattle feed and tech-
nology developed through expenditures deducted currently under
section 174(a). The cattle feed in Bliss was in the nature of an
inventory of supplies, 7 and remained so when distributed in liqui-
dation. Research and development expenses deducted pursuant to
section 174, on the other hand, are incurred in the development or
production of a specific technology and, at some point in time, are
transformed into a different asset, separate and distinct from any
of the costs incurred in producing it. The tax consequences result-
ing from the sale of that technology should be based on the tax
characteristics of the finished product, not on those of the antece-
dent costs of its development.7 4
This emerges as the more appropriate analysis when consider-
ation is given to the tax effect of consumed rather than uncon-
sumed cattle feed in a situation similar to Bliss. Assume a corpo-
rate taxpayer, engaged in breeding cattle, incurs expenses for feed
in year one and in year two the cattle consume a portion of that
feed prior to being sold. 75 Bliss and Anders require that the de-
71 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
73 See Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 401. The cattle feed purchased by Bliss was inventory, and
as such it failed to satisfy the definition of a capital asset under I.R.C. § 1221(a). Thus any
gain recognized on its disposition was taxable as ordinary income. Even if the cattle feed did
qualify as a capital asset under the statutory definition, the income recognized on the dispo-
sition would still be characterized as ordinary since the feed was used as a supply item in
the ordinary course of business. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S.
46, 47, 50 (1955) (sale of corn futures held to be integral part of manufacturing business,
thus taxable as ordinary income). Thus, disposition of the cattle feed produces ordinary
income whether such disposition involves the tax benefit rule or not, and characterization is
not at issue as it is in the attempt to apply the rule to recapture research and development
expenses on the disposition of developed technology. Cf. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 402 n.37.
Our discussion of the tax consequences on the sale of an expensed asset ... does
not suggest that the entire amount of proceeds on sale is attributable to the tax
benefit rule .... The appreciation would be recognized as gain... in the ordinary
sale, regardless of whether the taxpayer had expensed the asset upon acquisition.
Id.
I 4 Contrary to the sale of expensed supply items, the sale or exchange of the technology
would result in the realization of capital gain. See Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 357, 372-76 (1977), acq. 1978-2 C.B. 1.
" See I.R.C. § 1231(a), (b)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1985). Capital gain treatment is accorded
the sale or exchange of cattle held for breeding purposes provided the required two-year
holding period is satisfied. Id.
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ducted but unconsumed feed be recaptured at ordinary rates pur-
suant to the tax benefit rule. But what of the consumed feed? It
has increased the value of the cattle and, as a consequence, has
increased the capital gain recognized on their sale. Thus, the de-
duction at ordinary rates for cattle feed has been recovered at cap-
ital gain rates on sale of the cattle. Should a part of that gain,
equal to the cost of the consumed feed, be recaptured at ordinary
rates? No such assertion was made in Bliss or Anders or related
cases. 6 The consumed feed has been transformed into a distinctly
different asset for tax purposes in the same manner that research
and development costs are transformed into technology. The latter
should be subjected to tax without application of the tax benefit
rule as are, apparently, the proceeds of sale allocable to values pro-
duced by consumed feed.
Moreover, given the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hillsboro,
the recovery of research and development expenses at capital gain
rates upon the sale of developed technology would not be consid-
ered fundamentally inconsistent with the original deduction taken
pursuant to section 174(a). In Hillsboro, the effect of payment of
the shareholders tax by the bank pursuant to section 164(e) was to
shift the deduction for the payment from the shareholder to the
bank. What was a constructive dividend to shareholders resulting
from the bank's payment of their tax liability was converted by
virtue of the refund into a cash dividend to the shareholders. The
Supreme Court determined that the legislative history of section
164(e) concerned itself only with the payment by the bank of the
tax that was imposed upon its shareholders, and not with the use
to which the collected tax was put by the State of Illinois. Thus,
the refund of the tax to the shareholders was not fundamentally
inconsistent with the allowance of the deduction to the bank. Simi-
larly, the legislative intent underlying section 174 was to facilitate
the deduction of research and development costs by eliminating
the uncertainties inherent in determining the useful life of the de-
veloped technology.7 7 It is not in the least concerned with the con-
76 See, e.g., Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1970).
The expense deduction as permitted by regulation is intended to reflect the cost of
feed actually consumed during the taxable year and to accomplish over a period
of years roughly the same result as would have been had through use of the inven-
tory method, but by a simpler form of accounting.
Id.
" See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
1985]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:26
sequences of the disposition of that technology. Therefore, such
disposition is no more fundamentally inconsistent with the prior
deduction of the costs of development than was the disposition of
the collected tax by the State of Illinois in HilIsboro.
Approached less narrowly it can be argued that Hillsboro
seeks to impose transactional equity so that events are treated con-
sistently with those that are related but subsequent in time, but
not at the cost of disregarding well-defined but contrary Congres-
sional intent or judicial precedent. When a concept of general ap-
plicability such as transactional equity conflicts with a more spe-
cific congressional or judicial policy or precedent, the latter should
prevail.78 The application of the tax benefit rule to research and
development costs to achieve tax equity and consistency is pre-
cisely that case.
Congressional policy clearly favors preferential treatment for
the development and disposition of technology. That policy is ex-
emplified by the enactment of section 1235 11 specifically to remove
administrative impediments to taxing the disposition of patented
technology under section 1231 at capital gain rates.80 Another in-
78 Compare Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 404, 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (rejecting majority's view that purpose of tax benefit rule was to parallel results
created by tax system based on transactional rather than annual accounting, in absence of
legislative action repudiating Court's approach over past half century) with Fribourg Navi-
gation, 383 U.S. at 283-86 (Commissioner's position, which ignored congressional mandate
that recapture of depreciation as ordinary income limited to percentage of excess over
straight line depreciation, untenable).
79 I.R.C. § 1235 (West Supp. 1985) was enacted as part of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 and provides, generally, for capital gain treatment to the creator of a patent provided
all substantial rights to the patent are transferred. Payments for the transfer of these rights
may extend over the life of the patent or be made contingent on its productivity, use or
disposition.
so See H.R. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1954). Prior to the enactment of §
1231 in 1942, only technology not held for use in a trade or business or not subject to a
depreciation allowance because of its indeterminate useful life qualified as a capital asset,
resulting in the realization of capital gain upon its disposition. Section 1231 changed this by
qualifying depreciable technology used in a trade or business for capital gain treatment.
Generally, capital gain treatment was denied only when an inventor was considered to have
held depreciable property for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. One of
the factors used to determine whether an inventor was engaged in a trade or business was
the number of sales of technology made. The number of sales transactions necessary to
effect this transformation was uncertain. Accordingly, "professional" inventors, who sold nu-
merous patents, received different tax treatment from "amateurs" who were not as prolific.
An additional uncertainty in capital gain treatment for patent sales occurred when consider-
ation for the disposition was contingent on the use or productivity of the transferred tech-
nology. The Service argued that such a transfer was a license, rather than a sale, and the
proceeds received were royalties taxable as ordinary income. Although overwhelmingly re-
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stance of preferential treatment is the recent enactment of the tax
credit provided in section 44F for incremental research and devel-
opment costs.81
Section 174 is but a further indication of this favored treat-
ment. It eliminated uncertainties as to the deductibility of devel-
opment costs caused by factual problems in determining the useful
life of developed technology. It did so either by permitting a cur-
rent deduction for research and development costs (whether or not
the developed technology had a determinable useful life) or by al-
lowing such costs to be amortized over a period of not more than
sixty months (but only when the technology did not have a deter-
minable useful life). These provisions create a regime in which the
costs of technological development are currently deductible pursu-
ant to section 174 and the proceeds of sale are taxed at capital gain
rates. If that regime is to be altered so that a portion of the pro-
ceeds of sale are to be taxed at ordinary rather than capital rates,
it should be done explicitly by act of Congress. Alteration by the
Service merely creates new administrative uncertainties, in place of
those Congress sought to eliminate, that would inhibit technologi-
cal development. Indeed, there is a specific statutory provision,
section 1245, which recaptures the costs of development of technol-
ogy but under limited circumstances. It does not reach develop-
ment costs deducted under section 174 and the more generally ap-
plicable tax benefit rule should not be invoked to provide that
result.82
jected by the courts, the Service adhered to this position and uncertainty continued to exist.
See id. at 115.
81 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(a), 95 Stat. 172, 241
(1981). Section 44F(a) permits credit equal to 25% of the excess of the qualified research
expenses incurred in a taxable year over the base period research expenses. See Arem, supra
note 33, at 208. A qualified research expense is incurred in connection with the taxpayer's
trade or business and includes in-house research, contract research, and specified corporate
programs financing basic research by colleges, universities, and certain research organiza-
tions. See id. at 208-09. A base period research expense is defined as the mean of the quali-
fied research expenses over three taxable years prior to the taxable year for which the credit
is claimed. See id. at 210.
82 In GCM 39162, an internal memorandum supporting the technical advice, the Ser-
vice asserted that footnotes 20 and 33 of the Hillsboro opinion support the proposition that
I.R.C. § 1245 and the other statutory recapture provisions are not exclusive in their applica-
tion and the tax benefit rule can be invoked without specific statutory authorization. Foot-
note 20 of the Hillsboro opinion states that the applicability of the tax benefit rule depends
upon the specific Code provision involved. See Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 386 n.20. The Hills-
boro Court stated that the opinion merely gave the method of analysis to use in determining
whether the tax benefit rule requires the recognition of income upon the gift or bequest of
1985]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:26
Section 1245 provides for the recapture of depreciation deduc-
tions taken in respect of section 1245 property. Intangible personal
property that is depreciable pursuant to section 167 is included
within the meaning of section 1245 property. 3 Thus, the costs of
development of a patent that are charged to capital account and
depreciated pursuant to section 167, rather than deducted pursu-
ant to section 174(a), are subject to recapture at ordinary income
rates. 4 This is a specific and limited exception to the capital gain
treatment otherwise provided pursuant to section 1235 or section
1231.
When, however, the costs of development are not charged to
capital account but are currently deducted pursuant to section
174(a), the resulting intangible property is not depreciable under
section 167 and thus not subject to recapture.8 5 Similarly, the costs
of developing technology that has an indeterminate useful life are
not depreciable under section 167.86 Although, upon making the
appropriate election, these costs may be amortized over a period of
not more than sixty months under section 174(b), such deductions,
expensed property. The Court determined that resolution of such situations requires consid-
eration of the treatment of gifts and bequests as well as §§ 1245(b)(1), (2) and 1250(d)(1),
(2), which are partial codifications of the tax benefit rule. The reference to partial codifica-
tion is considered by the GCM to support wider applicability of the tax benefit rule in the
absence of specific statutory authorization. The Hillsboro Court's reference to these partial
codifications, however, appears to be merely a reference to the provisions of existing law
that required consideration in determining the potential application of the tax benefit rule.
The Court may have viewed those delineated sections as the outside parameters for the
application of the tax benefit rule, rather than as a foundation for application of recapture
rules beyond the limits defined in the statute.
GCM 39162 similarly misapplies footnote 33 of Hillsboro. It refers to H.R. REP. No.
1350, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), which proposed to amend §§ 1245 and 1250 to require
recapture of acquisition costs in addition to depreciation. While the Court viewed this pro-
posal as indicating that the possible application of recapture rules to corporate liquidations
would not frustrate the intent underlying § 336, it clearly has no relevance to research and
development costs that were specifically excluded from the scope of the proposed
amendment.
11 I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3)(A) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-3(b)(2) (1971).
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960); id. § 1.167(a)-6 (1957); id. § 1.1245-2(a)(3) (1978).
so See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-104, 1968-1 C.B. 361 (expensed supplies held not depreciable
property within § 167); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 528, 534 (Ct. Cl.
1973) ("The present consumption of an item is the exact opposite of the gradual sale of an
asset and it is therefore apparent that the current expensing is the antithesis of
depreciation").
In the absence of depreciation pursuant to § 167 or amortization pursuant to § 185,
property fails to qualify as "Section 1245 Property" as defined in I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3) and
recapture of depreciation at ordinary rates is inapplicable. See I.R.C. §1245 (a)(3)(A) (1972).
86 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960).
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while serving the same function as depreciation, are not the statu-
tory equivalent of amortization pursuant to section 167.87 Thus,
the costs of developing technology with an indeterminate life are
not subject to recapture pursuant to section 1245.
Even if technology whose costs had been deducted or amor-
tized under section 174 were includible within the meaning of sec-
tion 1245 property, ordinary income would not be recaptured on its
disposition since section 174 deductions are not included in the
definition of recomputed basis found in section 1245(a)(2).", Sec-
tion 1245 provides for recapture in an amount equal to the lesser
of the difference between (1) the recomputed basis or (2) the
amount realized or fair market value, whichever is applicable, and
the adjusted basis of the property. Thus, recapture cannot exceed
the difference between the adjusted basis and the recomputed ba-
sis of the property. The Code sections enumerated in section
1245(a)(2), which are to be used in the determination of recom-
puted basis, include depreciation and a detailed and specific list of
other similar deductions, but fail to include the deductions taken
under section 174. Thus, the adjusted basis of technology when
disposed of would be the same as its recomputed basis and there
would be no depreciation recapture. Only if the reference to depre-
ciation in section 1245(a)(2) could be interpreted to include section
174 deductions would a different result occur. That would appear
unwarranted under the definition of depreciation found in the reg-
87 I.R.C. § 174(b) (1982) is not included within the definitional scope of § 1245 prop-
erty, which includes only depreciable property under I.R.C. § 167 (West Supp. 1985), or
property amortizable under I.R.C. § 185 (1982). See supra notes 83-86. Amoritization pursu-
ant to I.R.C. § 174(b) (1982), cannot be considered the equivalent of depreciation or amorti-
zation under I.R.C. § 167 (West Supp. 1985), since such amortization is specifically permit-
ted only if it is taken with respect to nondepreciable property. See I.R.C. § 174(b) (1982).
I.R.C. § 185(a) (1982) deals only with the amortization of railroad grading and tunnel bores
and is apparently included within the meaning of § 1245 property because such amortiza-
tion is "in lieu of any depreciation . . . ." I.R.C. § 185(a) (1982).
88 I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2) (1982) provides in part:
(2) Recomputed basis. For purposes of this section the term "recomputed basis"
means-
(A) with respect to any property referred to in paragraph (3)(A) or (B), its ad-
justed basis recomputed by adding thereto all adjustments, attributable to periods
after December 31, 1961 ... reflected in such adjusted basis on account of deduc-
tions (whether in respect of the same or other property) allowed or allowable to
the taxpayer or to any other person for depreciation, or for amortization under
section 168 (as in effect before its repeal by the Tax Reform Act of 1976), 169, 179,
184, 185, 188, 190, 193, 194, or (in the case of property described in paragraph
(3)(C)) 191 ...
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ulations and existing judicial precedent.89
Thus, section 1245 recaptures only those costs of development
of intangible property with a determinable useful life that have
been charged to the capital account and depreciated under section
167. This specific provision for the recapture of depreciation and
amortization expenses at ordinary rather than at capital rates does
not provide for the recapture of current expenses or amortization
of intangible research and development costs deducted pursuant to
section 174. Congress enacted section 1245 precisely to alleviate
the perceived problem of the utilization of depreciation deductions
as an offset to ordinary income while the proceeds of sale of the
property thus depreciated were accorded capital gain treatment
under section 1231.90 Despite the fact that section 1245 was en-
acted nearly a decade after section 174 and has since been
amended to include deductions for amortization under other sec-
tions,9' no attempt has specifically been made to include the de-
ductions available under section 174 within its scope. In light of
this and of the proposed amendment to section 1245 in which re-
search and development costs were specifically excluded from the
proposed expanded application of that section, 2 it is unlikely that
Congress intended that the incentives to research and development
provided by section 174 be withdrawn or mitigated through appli-
cation of the tax benefit rule.
This same result should also obtain in circumstances unlike
those in the technical advice memorandum but similar to those of
Bliss, in which an economic recovery is not present. The distribu-
tion of technology, the costs of which were expensed pursuant to
section 174(a), in the course of liquidation is no more inconsistent
with that deduction than is the disposition of such technology by
means of a sale or exchange. In Bliss, a section 333 liquidation9 3
" See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
90 See S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 95, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3297, 3398.
91 See, e.g., Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 96-451, § 301(c)(1), 94 Stat.
1983, 1990-91 (amended 1981) (codified at I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2), (3)(D), (b) (1982)) (amortiza-
tion of reforestation -expenditures); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §
2122(b)(3)(A), 90 Stat. 1520, 1915 (codified at I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2), (3)(D) (1982)) (expendi-
tures for removal of architectural and transportation barriers to handicapped and elderly);
Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 303(c)(1), 85 Stat. 497, 522 (codified at I.RC. §
1245(a)(2), (3)(D) (1982)) (amortization of expenditures for on-the-job training and child
care facilities).
92 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
93 I.R.C. § 333 provides, generally, for the nonrecognition of gain to qualifying electing
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was an inconsistent event only because it precluded the taxpayer
from thereafter satisfying the premise upon which the prior deduc-
tion for cattle feed was based.e4 When Bliss ceased to exist as a
corporation, the feed could no longer be consumed for tax purposes
in the business in which it was acquired. That result, however, is
not true of every liquidation.
For example, if Bliss had been wholly owned by another cor-
poration and liquidated pursuant to section 332s5 rather than sec-
tion 333, the business would have continued to exist in corporate
form, with the basis of its assets unchanged.98 Essentially the same
business would have continued to use the unconsumed cattle feed.
Assuming the feed was ultimately consumed in full, nothing incon-
sistent would have transpired with respect to the prior expense ex-
cept a change in corporate form. It would be erroneous to impose
recapture through application of the tax benefit rule when in com-
parable circumstances the statutory rules of recapture under sec-
tions 1245 and 1250 are specifically made inapplicable.9 7
Distribution of developed technology in the course of a liqui-
dation of whatever kind is not an event that forever precludes ful-
fillment of the purpose underlying section 174(a)-that of fostering
the development of technology by eliminating the need to prove a
determinable useful life for developed technology in order to de-
shareholders, except to the extent that the distributing corporation has accumulated earn-
ings and profits or distributes cash and securities acquired after December 31, 1953, with
respect to liquidating distributions made within one calendar month. I.R.C. § 333(a), (e), (f)
(1982). With regard to an individual qualifying electing shareholder, the character of any
recognized gain is ordinary to the extent of such shareholder's ratable share of the corpora-
tion's accumulated earnings and profits, and capital to the extent that the cash and after
acquired securities distributed exceed such ratable share of earnings. Id. § 33(e). A qualify-
ing electing corporate shareholder recognizes only capital gain in these circumstances. Id. §
333(0.
See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 395-96 (1983).
95 I.R.C. § 332 provides for the nonrecognition of gain to a parent corporation upon the
distribution of property in liquidation of a subsidiary corporation in which it owns at least
80% of the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and of each other
class, except nonvoting stock which is limited and preferred as to dividends. I.R.C. § 332
(1982).
-6 I.R.C. § 334(b)(1) (1982).
97 See Feld, supra note 67, at 462; see also I.R.C. § 1245(b)(3) (1982) (if basis of prop-
erty in hands of transferee is determined by reference to basis in hands of transferor by
reason of application of § 332, amount of gain to transferor shall not be greater than amount
of gain recognized by transferor on transfer of such property); I.R.C. § 1250(d)(3) (1982) (if
basis of property in hands of transferee is determined by reference to transferor's basis by
reason of application of § 332, amount of gain to transferor shall not be greater than amount
of gain recognized by transferor on transfer of such property).
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duct the costs of development. This purpose is not frustrated by
the transfer of technology, whether by means of a liquidating dis-
tribution, a sale or otherwise. Rather, it has been fulfilled upon the
creation of new or improved technology. Its use by the transferee
in a liquidation or sale does not subvert that objective. On the con-
trary, the imposition of a tax at ordinary rates to recapture the
previous section 174(a) deduction when such technology is trans-
ferred would have that precise effect because it would be tanta-
mount to a denial of the deduction and the congressional policy
supporting it. Application of the tax benefit rule in this manner
would be equivalent, transactionally, to requiring that the costs of
development be capitalized, 8 thereby reducing the capital gain
upon disposition and increasing ordinary income by an equivalent
amount. It was exactly this result that section 174 was intended to,
and did, obviate. With respect to depreciation recapture, this re-
sult should be invoked only by an equally unambiguous statutory
assertion of Congressional intent and not by application of the tax
benefit rule.
3. Characterization As Affected By Related Doctrines.
Although the tax benefit rule may not be appropriate to the
task, there is considerable authority that the character of a trans-
action is determined by previously transpired events.99 These au-
98 Application of the tax benefit rule to a sale of technology would recharacterize capi-
tal gain as ordinary income to the extent of the research and development costs previously
deducted under I.R.C. § 174(a). The full amount realized from such a sale, however, would
also be recognized as gain under I.R.C. § 1001(a), since the basis of the technology being
sold would remain at zero due to the prior deduction. This would result in a duplication of
income: the amount of the recovery taxed at ordinary rates under the tax benefit rule would
also be reflected in the gain determined under § 1001 and taxed at capital rates. Such a
duplication should not be permitted under general principles of tax law, and to avoid that
result, an upward adjustment to basis should be made under I.R.C. § 1016(a) in the amount
of the gain characterized as ordinary income pursuant to the tax benefit rule.
A duplication of income is not generated by recapture of depreciation under I.R.C. §
1245 which merely recharacterizes a portion of the gain determined with respect to the dis-
position of depreciable under I.R.C. § 1001(a) as ordinary income. Thus, no adjustment to
the basis of such property is necessary or provided. In effect, recapture pursuant to the
section created the interrelationship between value and depreciation expense found wanting
in Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272 (1966). Ordinary income results
to the extent that depreciation expense has reduced the basis of the property being sold by
a greater amound than market forces have reduced its value.
" See, e.g., Rees Blow Pipe Mfg. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 598, 604 (1964) (amount
paid by seller in satisfying judgment for misrepresentation in sale of building held capital
loss), affd per curiam, 342 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1965); Estate of Shannonhouse v. Commis-
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thorities do not, however, require that the gain realized on the dis-
position of developed technology be taxed at ordinary rates to the
extent of research and development costs previously deducted
under section 174.
In Arrowsmith v. Commissioner,0 " the taxpayers had reported
capital gain on the liquidation of their corporation. In a year sub-
sequent to the liquidation, a judgment was rendered in favor of
creditors of the corporation and the taxpayers, as transferees, were
required to satisfy it. They then attempted to deduct that pay-
ment as an ordinary loss. The Supreme Court, however, required
that the deduction be treated as a capital loss rather than as an
ordinary loss despite the literal absence of a sale or exchange in
the year of payment. In the Court's view the integral relationship
between the two events, the liquidation and the payment to credi-
tors, required that they be treated consistently for tax purposes.
The capital nature of the liquidation was in essence permitted to
characterize the subsequent payment to creditors.
Had the payment of the judgment in Arrowsmith occurred in
the same taxable year as the liquidation, the assets available for
distribution and the capital gain realized by the shareholders
would have been decreased by an equivalent amount.110 The fact
that the two events transpired in different taxable years was not
permitted to change that fundamental result. The effect of the de-
cision was to offset the later payment of the judgment against the
previously realized capital gain because the obligation to pay the
judgment arose out of the liquidation without the intervention of
an event of independent significance.
The relationship between the sale of technology and the costs
incurred to develop it, however, is of an entirely different nature.
Although the technology would not exist "but for" 102 the previ-
sioner, 21 T.C. 422, 424 (1953) (amounts paid by seller of realty to purchaser in discharge of
liabilities for breach of covenant of title held capital loss); see Arrowsmith v. Commissioner,
344 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1952).
100 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
101 Id. at 8. The test applied in Hillsboro for determining the existence of a fundamen-
tally inconsistent event is essentially the same insofar as it considers the effect of the occur-
rence of a deduction and a recovery or inconsistent event in the same taxable year. See
supra note 66 and accompanying text.
102 See Anderson v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1370, 1374-76 (1971) (payment by employee
charged with securities violation held independent of prior capital gain on sale of stock). See
generally Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transactions on Federal Income Tax Conse-
quences of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAx L. REV. 85, 92-94 (1972) (issue is relation-
ship between transaction in one year and transaction in another).
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ously incurred development costs, once created, an independent
judgment must be made either to retain that technology in the
business or to sell or otherwise dispose of it based on its relative
value in these disparate uses. The disposition does not arise out of
the act of creation in the same manner as the payment of the judg-
ment by shareholders arises out of the prior liquidation. Even if
the sale of the technology were to occur in the same taxable year as
that in which the section 174(a) costs were deducted, the result
should not change: the creative process has no bearing on the deci-
sion to sell. That decision derives from other considerations.
Moreover, tax expenditures for research and development,
when successful, result in the creation of an asset entirely different
in character from those costs, destroy the necessary relationship
between the two events, and renders Arrowsmith inapplicable.
This analysis is supported by Continental Illinois National Bank
& Trust Co. v. Commissioner,'0 3 in which a corporation, prior to
filing for bankruptcy, guaranteed certain conditional sales con-
tracts and chattel mortgages that had been purchased by the peti-
tioner. Pursuant to an arrangement in bankruptcy, the bankrupt
corporation distributed its stock and two debentures to petitioner
in satisfaction of the contingent liability arising out of the guaran-
tee. Petitioner claimed a bad debt deduction measured by the dif-
ference between its unrecovered cost for the conditional sales con-
tracts and chattel mortgages and the value of the securities
received. In a later year, petitioner exchanged the debentures for
additional stock of the guarantor and contributed all of the stock
to charity. A charitable deduction was claimed equal to the value
of the stock, which, at that time, exceeded the amount of the bad
debt previously deducted. The government argued that the chari-
table deduction effected the equivalent of a double deduction con-
demned in United States v. Skelly Oil Co.,10 4 and that "this
should 'always' be viewed as relating back to the prior bad debt
charge-off. . . 'to invoke the tax benefit rule.' ,,105 The court re-
jected this assertion, holding that the receipt of the bankrupt's
stock and debentures closed the initial transaction in which the
bad debt was claimed. The subsequent benefit derived from the
charitable deduction was attributed to appreciation of the stock
103 69 T.C. 357 (1977), acq. 1978-2 C.B. 1.
394 U.S. 678, 684 (1969).
105 Continental Illinois, 69 T.C. at 365.
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received. This was a new and different investment involving risks
different from the conditional sales contracts and chattel mort-
gages originally held, and thus did not constitute a tax benefit re-
covery of the previously deducted bad debt.
This same position was asserted by the Service in Revenue
Ruling 66-320106 in which X was indebted to Y for $5,000 and par-
tially satisfied that indebtedness by a transfer of property worth
$3,000. Y properly deducted the unsatisfied portion of the obliga-
tion of $2,000 as a bad debt in 1961 without tax benefit. Y sold the
property in 1965 for $5,000 realizing a gain of $2,000 which it at-
tempted to exclude from income pursuant to section 111 on the
ground that it represented a recovery of the bad debt previously
deducted without tax benefit in 1961. In denying this contention,
the ruling states:
Under the above circumstances, the acquisition by the credi-
tor of the property in partial satisfaction of the indebtedness is
separate and distinct from the subsequent sale of such property,
and the gain realized on such sale does not represent income at-
tributable to a recovery of the unsatisfied portion of the original
indebtedness. 07
It is submitted that the transformation of deductible research
and development costs into a new and separate asset, technology,
having tax and investment characteristics entirely different from
those originating costs, should similarly vitiate the essential nexus
between the initial deduction and the subsequent recovery and
should thereby render the tax benefit rule inapplicable.
In Skelly Oil, the taxpayer included certain contested cus-
tomer receipts in income and deducted 27 and /2 percent thereof
as the allowable percentage depletion allowance."' 8 In the subse-
quent taxable year, the contested receipts were required to be re-
funded and the taxpayer deducted the full amount of the rebate
without reduction for the previously deducted depletion allowance.
The Supreme Court refused to permit a deduction of the full
amount of the rebate since that would grant "the practical
108 Rev. Rul. 66-320, 1966-2 C.B. 37.
107 Id. at 38.
108 Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. at 679-80. The allowable deduction for percentage depletion of
oil and gas wells at that time was 27.5%. See I.R.C. § 613 (1958), partially repealed by Tax
Reform Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 501(b), 89 Stat. 26, 47, amended by Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2115(a), (b)(2), 90 Stat. 1525, 1907-08.
1985]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
equivalent of a double deduction" 109 absent a clear expression of
congressional intent to that effect. Instead it required that the de-
duction with respect to the rebate be reduced by the depletion al-
lowance previously expensed. The Court recognized the transac-
tional nature of the issue by relying on Arrowsmith for the
proposition that "if money was taxed at a special lower rate when
received, the taxpayer would be accorded an unfair tax windfall if
repayments were generally deductible from receipts taxable at the
higher rate applicable to ordinary income.'' °
This analysis has been criticized"' as a misapplication of the
principle of Arrowsmith, which explicitly decided the characteriza-
tion of a current deduction as capital or ordinary based upon the
degree of relationship of prior events to that deduction. Arrow-
smith, however, did not involve the duplication of tax benefits, all
at ordinary tax rates, as presented in Skelly Oil. While the charac-
terization involved in Arrowsmith can work either to the benefit or
to the detriment of the government, the duplication of benefits
under Skelly Oil operates to the government's detriment in every
instance.112
The combination of the deduction of research and develop-
ment costs against ordinary income and the recovery of those costs
upon the sale of the developed technology at capital gain rates ap-
pears to provide the duplication of tax benefits prohibited by
Skelly Oil. But the resulting benefit is from the characterization of
the gain realized on disposition of the technology, which does not
always produce the quantitative duplication of benefits with which
Skelly Oil is concerned. For example, realization of a long term
capital gain on disposition of technology would not produce a tax
advantage to the extent the taxpayer was required to offset such
gain with short term capital losses otherwise available to offset or-
dinary income. 11
Skelly Oil involves the reduction in the amount of a claimed
deduction to prevent what the Court considered the equivalent of
a double deduction; it did not concern itself with the generation of
income resulting from the recovery of a prior deduction, as is tradi-
109 394 U.S. at 684 (quoting Charles Ilfield Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62, 68 (1934)).
110 394 U.S. at 685.
'" See Rabinovitz, supra note 102, at 110-15; Schenk, Arrowsmith and its Progeny:
Tax Characterization by Reference to Past Events, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 317, 339 (1981).
:12 See 394 U.S. at 686.
11 See Rabinovitz, supra note 102, at 127-28.
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tionally involved in the application of the tax benefit rule. Never-
theless, the Court in its approach to these differing situations rec-
ognized a certain similarity between them. 14 With the decision in
Hillsboro, the analogy between Skelly Oil and application of the
tax benefit rule has become more manifest. By virtue of Hillsboro,
an economic recovery is no longer required; only an event funda-
mentally inconsistent with the prior deduction is necessary to ap-
ply the tax benefit rule. That requirement was fully satisfied in
Skelly Oil since the refund of customer fees, if it had occurred in
the same taxable year in which those amounts were received,
would have resulted in no income having been reported. As a re-
sult, a deduction for depletion based on the rebated receipts would
not have been allowed. Hillsboro, therefore, can be seen as ex-
panding the scope of the tax benefit rule to situations involving a
duplication of tax benefits,11 such as Skelly Oil, that were for-
merly analogous but not directly pertinent to application of that
rule.
Nevertheless, approached as a tax benefit case, Skelly Oil
should not deny capital gain treatment to the sale or exchange of
technology whose costs have been previously deducted pursuant to
section 174(a). Skelly Oil recognizes that a duplication of tax bene-
fits is permitted when Congress clearly so intends. 6 In other
words, there is no fundamentally inconsistant event if Congress in-
tends a duplication of benefits. Congress has provided a clear ex-
pression of its intention to allow a duplication of benefits by per-
mitting the section 174(a) deduction for research and development
costs and by permitting capital gain treatment for the sale of the
technology thereby developed pursuant to either section 1221, 1231
or 1235. These congressional mandates should not be ignored
through an unwarranted extension of the tax benefit rule.
APPLICABILITY OF TAx BENEFIT RULE TO OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSET
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
The characteristics of research and development costs of tech-
nology that justify an exception to the application of the tax bene-
114 394 U.S. at 685-86.
'" See generally Del Cotto & Joyce, Double Benefits and Transactional Consistency
Under the Tax Benefit Rule, 39 TAx L. REv. 473, 483-84, 488-90 (1984) (Congress intended
no double benefit of deduction and exclusion).
I" See 394 U.S. at 684.
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fit rule are equally pertinent to the costs of development of other
intangible assets, 117 such as circulation expenditures incurred in
the creation of a subscription list 18 and trademark and tradename
expenditures.11 9
Each of the latter provisions was enacted to ameliorate
problems of distinguishing between those expenditures properly
chargeable to capital account and those that are appropriate cur-
rent period expenses.1 20 For example, assume a magazine makes an
extensive promotional mailing greatly in excess of its usual efforts
and that the mailing is made by the regular, full-time employees of
the circulation department of the magazine. In the absence of sec-
tion 173, should all of these expenses be currently deducted as pe-
riod costs incurred in the ordinary course of business to maintain
existing operating revenues, or should they be capitalized, either in
whole or in part, as providing benefits to future periods?12 Should
characterization depend upon the relative size of the mailing com-
pared to normal operations, and whether it is undertaken by the
regular employees of the circulation department or temporary em-
ployees hired specifically for that purpose? The right to deduct
17 The legislature has provided for the recapture of specific intangible development
expenses. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1982) (soil and water conservation and land clearing
expenditures converted from capital gain to ordinary income on sale of farm land); id. §
1254(a)(1) (converts proceeds of disposition of oil, gas or geothermal property from capital
gain to ordinary income to extent of intangible drilling and development costs previously
deducted).
118 See id. § 173 (West Supp. 1985) (expenditures to establish, maintain or increase
circulation of newspaper or periodical not chargeable to capital account allowed as
deduction).
119 See id. § 177 (trademark or tradename expenditure allowed as deduction at election
of taxpayer); see also Danskin, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 360, 362 (2d Cir. 1964) (dic-
tum) (section 177 permits taxpayer to elect to treat as deduction what otherwise would be
capital expenditure).
120 S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (I.R.C. § 173); S. REP. No. 1941, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (I.R.C. § 177); see also E. H. Sheldon & Co. v. Commissioner, 214
F.2d 655, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1954) (cost of publication of yearly catalogs held to be deductible
expense even though its effect may extend beyond taxable year thereby having capital ex-
penditure attributes).
"I Prior to the introduction of I.R.C. § 173, money spent to increase magazine circula-
tion was held to be a capital expenditure and thus not deductible as an ordinary expense.
See Meredith Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 890, 891 (8th Cir. 1933). Recoup-
ment of such costs would occur only upon disposition of the list, since amortization of the
capitalized development costs were prohibited in the absence of a determinable useful life
for the list. See id. at 891-92. But see Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States,
481 F.2d 1240, 1251 (5th Cir. 1973) (depreciation deduction allowed after jury determination
that purchased circulation list is intangible asset with determinable useful life), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1129 (1974); Manhattan Co. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 78, 93 (1968).
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currently all such expenditures dispenses with these problems of
classification. Similar problems exist with respect to trademarks
and tradenames. Although the expenses of creation, such as sala-
ries or consulting fees of those responsible for the initial creative
effort, may be more readily distinguishable as capital rather than
current period expenses, the costs incurred in developing recogni-
tion of such trademark or tradename, including extensive current
period advertising expenses, may be more difficult to classify as
either capital or ordinary.122
It would be anomolous to recreate these issues of classification
and allocation as they existed prior to enactment of section 173
and section 177 by requiring the proceeds of disposition of the cre-
ated subscription list or trademark to be taxed in part as ordinary
income rather than as capital gain.123 Application of the tax benefit
rule clearly would have that effect since an allocation would be re-
quired to determine those expenses that were truly current and
thus unrelated to development of the intangible asset values real-
ized as a result of the disposition. Since these current expenses
would not be recovered as part of the proceeds of sale, they would
not be subject to recapture. However, development expenditures
that were truly capital in nature would have contributed to the
122 The development costs of a trademark or tradename, if capitalized prior to the in-
troduction of I.R.C. § 177, were recovered only upon sale, since amortization of those costs
was ordinarily denied in the absence of a determinable useful life for the trademark or
tradename. See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 326, 329 (1934). Section
177 of the Code, by providing only for amortization of development costs over 60 months or
more rather than providing for a current deduction as does I.R.C. § 173, alleviates, but does
not eliminate, the allocation problem. To the extent these development expenditures can be
allocated to a current expense such as advertising, rather than to capitalized development
costs that require amortization, an acceleration of the deduction results, and the taxpayer
will attempt to realize that benefit of timing.
123 See supra note 26. The disposition of a trademark or tradename will be denied capi-
tal gain treatment pursuant to I.R.C. § 1253 when the transferor retains a significant power,
right, or interest in the intangible asset sold.
It appears that I.R.C. § 1245 would not apply to recapture as ordinary income any part
of the proceeds of sale of a circulation list if the costs of production were deducted currently
under I.R.C. § 173. The asset is not one that is subject to an allowance for depreciation and
this result is, therefore, appropriate. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. This
applies equally to amortization of the development costs of a trademark or tradename, since
a trademark or tradename is not depreciable property in the absence of a determinable life,
see supra note 122, and amortization of such costs pursuant to I.R.C. § 177 should not be
considered the equivalent of a deduction for depreciation under § 167, see supra note 87
and accompanying text. The trademark or tradename whose costs have been expensed
under I.R.C. § 177, thus, does not satisfy the definitional requirement of "Section 1245
Property" as set forth in I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3).
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creation of asset values and thus would be recovered on sale of the
intangible property. The expenditures would be recaptured by ap-
plication of the tax benefit rule. But to apply the rule and thereby
require classification of development expenses as current or capital
would vitiate the very purpose for which sections 173 and 177 were
enacted. The tax benefit rule should not be applied to provide such
an inappropriate result.
The very fact that there are difficulties in appropriately distin-
guishing between true current costs and the capital costs of intan-
gible asset development indicates a more attenuated relationship
between the developed asset and such costs. Stated otherwise, the
integral relationship between the initial deduction and the subse-
quent recovery or fundamentally inconsistent event necessary to
the application of the tax benefit rule does not exist between the
costs deducted pursuant to section 173 and section 177 and the
sale or other disposition of the resultant intangible asset. This lack
of an essential nexus between the prior deduction of these intangi-
ble asset development costs and their recovery is perhaps best il-
lustrated by the relationship between goodwill and the costs in-
curred in its development.124 Whether goodwill is defined as the
ability to generate profits in excess of those of similarly situated
businesses 125 or the ability to retain customers,'126 it is created by
the totality of the expenditures incurred in the business. If the sale
of goodwill were to be considered subject to application of the tax
benefit rule, should these expenditures be considered recovered so
as to generate ordinary income rather than capital gain and, if so,
to what extent? Clearly, any such attempt would be both improba-
ble and impractical. In the same manner and for essentially the
same reasons, the tax benefit rule should not be applied in an at-
tempt to recover development costs of intangible assets upon their
dispostion, even though some nexus may be established.
As in the case of research and development costs, the sale of
these intangible assets results in a capital gain greater than it
would otherwise have been by the amount of the development
124 See Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1956)
(goodwill is value resulting from patronage of habitual customers, reputation for skill, acci-
dental circumstances or historical prejudices); Grace Bros. Inc. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d
170, 175-76 (9th Cir. 1949) (goodwill is sum total of imponderables that compel patrons to
choose one business over another).
125 See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 241.
2 See I.R.S. Pub. No. 544 (CCH) 9 (1979) (goodwill is every positive advantage that
firm acquires in progress of business).
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costs expensed or amortized rather than capitalized in the course
of development. Thus, the recovery has been subjected to tax, but
at capital gains rates. The tax benefit rule should not be extended
beyond its traditional function in the recognition of taxable income
to recharacterize a portion of that gain from capital to ordinary.
CONCLUSION
From its inception to the present, the tax benefit rule has been
applied to provide transactional equity in the recognition of in-
come. This rule should not be administratively extended to
recharacterize income recognized by virtue of other provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code. That function, if it is to be performed,
should be limited to the statutory rules of recapture specifically
enacted by Congress to serve that purpose. These statutory provi-
sions are the congressional response to perceived inequities in per-
mitting deductions that affect the basis of property to be offset
against ordinary income while the proceeds of sale of that property
are taxed at capital gains rates. Extension by the Service of the
scope of the statutory rules of recapture would vitiate the benefits
specifically granted by Congress in enacting the deductions sought
to be recaptured. Such action should be undertaken by Congress
and not by administrative extension of the tax benefit rule. Deduc-
tions granted as a matter of legislative grace should fall from grace
by the same hand.
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